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ABSTRACT
Shipping executives interested in ways of
controlling their costs should regard bunker price
risk management as an attractive financial policy.
Implementing such a policy necessitates some
knowledge of the dynamics of the fuel oil market.
Bunker prices in the future will be affected by the
price of crude oil as well as developments occurring
in the three major fuel oil markets of Europe, the
Americas and the Far East. The growth of the oil
trade in the exchanges of these regions has led to
the creation of numerous financial tools which could
support a hedging program. The very basic, over-
the-counter instruments, swaps and options, are also
the most appropriate for use. Considerations on the
nature of the risk to be hedged, and how it affects
profitability, should be part of the decision making
process leading to a competitive hedging strategy.
The structure of a hedging program should also be
consistent with a company's overall perception of
risk. The example of a shipping company is used to
examine implementation issues.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus
Title: Professor of Marine Systems
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Public perception has it that shipping is a
profitable industry where the earning potential of a
vessel is not necessarily related to the quality of
transportation it provides. In reality however,
certain segments of the shipping industry,
especially the segment relating to oil
transportation, have suffered from chronically
depressed freight rates regardless of the quality of
the ship itself or that of its owner's management.
Against a background of low profitabilities, one
finds shipping executives looking for ways to
control if not cut their costs.
The proportions of energy expenses in the cost
structure of a vessel's operation are significant.
Generally speaking, the costs of a vessel can be
classified as operating and running. The former
include crew wages, maintenance and repair costs.
The latter are variable depending on the voyage the
ship performs and include port disbursements and the
cost of its fuel consumption. In the tanker segment
of the shipping industry, the cost of a large
vessel's daily fuel consumption might be greater
than its fixed operating cost. Clearly then, a
shipowner's ability to control this cost becomes a
critical factor affecting his vessel's
profitability.
The disruptions in the oil trade caused by the
1990 Gulf War resulted in a significant but
temporary increase in the price of crude oil and its
by-products. At that time the price of fuel oil
used to run ships' engines-bunker fuel-increased by
more than 100% in a matter of days. Since then,
bunker prices have never reached the same levels of
volatility. Even so, managing bunker price
volatility, even in periods when it is less
pronounced, is a financial policy with merits.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a
number of issues that a shipping company should
consider before putting together a risk management
strategy for its bunker purchases. It consists of
three parts, each one presented in a different
chapter. The content of these chapters and how they
relate to each other will be outlined below. The
remainder of this introduction will be used to
explain certain terms and concepts which will be
utilized in the remainder of this paper.
The first chapter discusses the factors which
are likely to influence the price of crude oil and
that of bunkers in the product's major markets.
Bunker fuel is one of the heavier by-products of
crude oil. Therefore, its price is affected by the
price of the commodity it is derived from. Bunker
fuel price also fluctuates depending on the
product's separate dynamics of supply and demand. A
review of the fundamentals for crude and fuel oil
prices will help develop a knowledge base indicating
how bunker prices are likely to be affected in the
future. Strictly speaking, protection from price
volatility can be achieved regardless of the
direction a commodity's value is likely to follow
and therefore information regarding fundamentals
could be immaterial. However, it will be argued in
this introduction that a price protection strategy
should still have an underlying reason to justify
it. This argument will be reinforced in the third
chapter which will discuss the implementation of a
long term price risk management strategy by a
particular shipping company.
The second chapter presents the different tools
available to a shipping company interested in
putting together a price risk management strategy.
The first financial instrument that will be
presented is the futures contract. It will be
argued that certain characteristics of this contract
render it unsuitable for the purpose of price risk
management. The growth of oil trading in the formal
exchanges of New York, London and Singapore has
facilitated the development of alternative financial
instruments, like swaps and options, which cover the
same bunker price risk in different ways. The
particular characteristics of these over-the-counter
instruments determine their suitability for a given
strategy. Derivative products based on swaps and
options, can be combined in numerous ways to fit
exactly a company's requirements and cover its
exposure. However, a complicated custom design
would compromise their competitive price.
Consequently, the basic, "plain vanilla", widely
traded, over-the-counter instruments will prove to
be the most advantageous in a price risk management
scheme.
The purpose of the third chapter is to discuss
the framework of a price risk management strategy
that could be implemented by a shipping company,
Eletson Corporation. The first part of this chapter
looks at this issue from a theoretical viewpoint
debating for the usefulness of such a strategy if it
is designed consistently with a company's corporate
strategy and executed carefully. The rest of the
chapter uses the example of Eletson Corporation and
demonstrates the kind of issues that should be
considered before the company decides on a bunker
price risk management program. The strategy that
each company chooses to follow should be carefully
selected so as to fit well with its overall profile
towards risk. Therefore, the degree of risk a
shipping company is exposed to due to the volatility
of bunker prices should not be looked at separately
but in conjunction with how it affects the company's
performance.
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the
findings of this thesis. The rest of this
introduction then, will clarify certain terms and
concepts which will be used throughout the remainder
of this paper, but especially in chapters two and
three.
Bunker fuel is another name for the type of
fuel that is used for power generation in ships'
engines. It is one of the heavier and cheaper by-
products of crude oil when compared to heating oil,
jet fuel or gasoline. To distinguish among the
different types of fuel oils, one of the most
frequently referred characteristics is its sulphur
content. Fuel oils retain 80% of the sulphur of the
crude they are derived from. High sulphur fuels are
usually derived from the heavier crude oils and are
used as marine fuel. Marine fuel oil is not the
only source of energy on a vessel. Diesel or gas
oils are also consumed in auxiliary systems but in
much smaller quantities. Therefore, despite the
higher prices of these products, it is fuel oil that
constitutes the biggest energy generation cost
variable for a shipowner.
The price of any particular oil product depends
on two factors. The first, obvious one, is whether
supply and demand for this product are in
equilibrium. The second factor has to do with the
price of the crude oil that the product is derived
from. These two factors can exert pressure on a
product's price but usually work independently of
each other. Crude oils are priced differently to
reflect unlike properties and their suitability to
produce similar products in different proportions.
Simple or sophisticated refining processes also
affect the proportion or properties of products
derived from crude.
If the price of a crude which produces
relatively small quantities of fuel oil increases,
the price of fuel oil will not be significantly
affected; at least not as much as the other products
produced in larger proportions. For example, North
Sea crude is considered to be suitable for the
production of lighter products in larger
proportions. Refined product types from this crude
can be produced by a hydroskimming
refineryl in the following proportions: 38% fuel
oils, 24% gas oils, 15% kerosenes and 23% gasolines
1 Every crude is initially processed through primary atmospheric distillation. This
procedure shows the most obvious difference between crudes, in the different yields
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and Chemical feedstocks. Arabian Heavy crude
produces a very different slate of product types at
the same refinery: 53% fuel oils, 18% gas oils, 11%
kerosenes and 18% gasolines and chemical feedstocks.
As a general guideline, dense crude oils
produce less of the light, expensive material like
gasolines and more of the heavy fuel oils. The
proportions are reversed for the lighter crudes. In
between the gasolines and the fuel oils, the
proportions of the middle distillates like gas oils
and kerosenes vary accordingly. Therefore, the
price of a product is affected by, but not directly
related to, the price of the crude it is produced
from. Different crude prices affect product prices
in different ways. However, it is safe to say that
despite very complicated pricing structures, rising
crude prices pull product prices with them.
Conversely, strong demand for products means
pressure on crude oil prices to rise. Weak demand
for products will drive crude prices down.
The variety of crude oil characteristics is one
reason that complicates the dynamics of the products
market. Refining processes are the second. It was
mentioned earlier that a hydroskimming refinery
allows for the distillation of North Sea or Arabian
Heavy crude oils in different proportions. These
yields would be altered under a different refinery
process. A gradual increase in the world demand for
lighter products like diesel, jet fuel or gasoline
has caused a restructuring of the refining industry
of products at prescribed boiling ranges. A hydroskimming operation is one where a
resulting product, naphtha, is processed further and upgraded to increase the
gasoline yield.
in order to "whiten the barrel," i.e. produce more
of the lighter products. Another interesting aspect
of the refining processes is that modern refineries
have the flexibility of altering the proportions of
the refined products they produce in response to
seasonal changes in demand for these products. For
example, refineries in the United States increase
the production of gasoline early in the Spring
before the driving season begins and limit the
production of heating oil. The process is reversed
in the Fall when stocks of heating oil need to be
built up in expectation of cold weather.
Converting crude to produce more of the
expensive light products to the detriment of the
residual fuel oils is done with a variety of
processes such as thermal cracking, catalytic
cracking or hydrocracking. An explanation of these
processes in any detail would be outside the scope
of this project. However, it is important to
remember that advanced refining procedures reduce
the inexpensive fuel oil yield derived from crude
oils. Therefore, plans for additional refinery
capacity usually mean reduced production of the
residual fuel oils. This development also impacts
the quality of the refined fuels.
A bunker price risk management program need not
be affected by the quality of the physical product
supplied to a vessel. There are other ways to check
this aspect of the bunkering operation. A risk
management scheme is based on the fact that changes
in physical bunker prices are somehow reflected in
the commodity exchange prices where oil is traded.
This is why understanding how different types of
crudes or refining processes might affect fuel oil
volumes and prices, constitutes vital information
for someone interested in the complex dynamics of
the spot price of this commodity.
If fuel oil is going to be more expensive when
bought in the future, then an offsetting gain in the
commodity markets between now and the future can
neutralize or limit the potential loss from the
physical purchase. This activity is called hedging.
The underlying difference between hedging and
speculating then, is that the former is related to a
commodity that needs to be bought or sold in the
future at an unknown price and a price risk needs to
be neutralized. Speculating, is taking the position
that the price of a commodity in the future will be
higher or lower than what the market thinks now it
is going to be at that time.
Predicting fuel oil prices in the future is not
an easy exercise; a shipowner who does it well
should consider changing his profession. But
managing the risk relating to bunker price
volatility has little to do with a precise forecast
of the commodity's price. A shipowner need not be a
fuel trader or a speculator who tries to take
advantage of the market's adjustment to the laws of
supply and demand. Managing the risk of volatile
bunker prices really means increasing the certainty
that a volume of the commodity, bought in the
future, will cost a price which can be determined
today.
The basic instrument that offers protection
against volatile bunker prices is the futures
contract. It represents the commitment to buy or
sell a quantity of oil of a defined quality at a
specified place and date in the future at the price
this oil will be worth at that time. The price of
this contract at the time it is bought or sold
depends on the market's perception about the future.
It is important to remember that this contract need
not be executed at the time of its expiry. A
shipowner may enter the commitment to buy a quantity
of oil in the distant future and sell this
commitment the next day at a higher or lower price
depending on the market. This is the essence of oil
paper trading. Contracts are linked to physical
quantities of oil so as to have a price dictated by
market perception about the future and eventually a
price consistent with the spot price at their
expiry. However, they need not represent actual
physical commodities at the time they are traded.
In reality, a very small fraction of futures
contracts become actual physical cargoes.
Suppose that the shipowner knows he will need
to buy a certain quantity of bunker fuel when his
ship arrives in port sometime in a future month. He
is not sure what bunker prices will look like at
that time but he would rather determine now how much
he is going to pay later. If he buys a futures
contract now and sells it at the time the ship takes
the fuel, he can either make a profit on this paper
transaction, if in the interim period fuel prices
have appreciated (market perception has been revised
upwards), or a loss if prices have declined.
However, if prices have indeed appreciated, he will
have to pay more for the expensive fuel destined for
his ship. In this case however, the shipowner need
not worry. His profit from the paper transaction
will offset the extra cost of his physical supply.
The owner has successfully hedged himself against an
adverse price movement. Obviously, if bunker prices
actually decline, he would have been better off
doing nothing. The benefit of this strategy is the
certainty of a fixed cost rather than a monetary
gain. A loss is possible too.
A successful hedging strategy then, is one
where the probability of a loss is smaller than that
of a potential gain. For this reason, it is
critical for a shipowner who is considering hedging
his exposure to volatile bunker prices to understand
how bunker prices are affected and how they are
likely to move in the future. The following chapter
will present information which is relevant to this
issue.
Chapter 2: Market Fundamentals
It was previously demonstrated that a pure
hedging strategy does not necessitate specific
knowledge of market fundamentals or the drivers
that are expected to move bunker fuel prices one
way or another. Nevertheless, a successful
hedging strategy that limits the downside
potential of a loss should somehow incorporate
knowledge about the factors that are expected to
likely affect the price of fuel oil, in the
short, medium or long term future. A view as to
what the market is likely to do and why can only
add reason to the hedging position of a shipping
company.
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine
the factors and conditions affecting the prices
of bunker fuels and reach a conclusion as to what
they are likely to do in the next one to two
years. It consists of two parts. The first one
examines the prospects for the price of crude
oil. Fluctuations in the price of crude affect
the price of residual fuel oil, the latter being
one of the heavier by-products of the former.
The second part examines the outlook for the
price of fuel oil in general but also with
regards to the three biggest markets of the
product, in Europe, the Americas and the Far
East.
a. Crude Oil Fundamentals
An issue that needs to be examined in the
first part of this Chapter is who or what will
dictate the price of crude oil in the future. It
seems that one of the most substantial
developments since the mid-80s, i.e. the
dominance of the paper markets in setting the
price for the most precious of commodities, will
continue in the future. The growth of non-Opec
oil production has substantially reduced Opec's
ability to control oil prices. Therefore, the
price setting role of the world's oil trade has
been transferred to the mercantile exchanges of
London, New York and Singapore, and the traders
and well-endowed funds of Wall Street who are
into oil paper trading.
This is not to say that Opec will no longer
be able to influence oil prices. If the
organization manages to maintain its credibility,
by following a stable oil policy where members
abide by their quotas, then it should be able to
affect the supply and demand equation in order to
provide support for the price of crude. It
should be made clear however, that the
organization is unlikely to return to a policy of
fixed pricing since that would involve the Saudis
acting as the swing producer, a role they are not
keen to play anymore.
Once it is established that the laws of
supply and demand as evaluated by the oil markets
will determine the price of crude oil in the
future, it becomes easier to take a position on a
range where this price is likely to fluctuate.
World oil demand is forecast to continue to grow
over the next ten years from 68.2 million barrels
per day in 1994 to at least 79 mb/d in 2005.
Non-Opec supply is expected to increase from 39.7
mb/d in 1994 to 42.8 mb/d in 2005. Consequently,
Opec's supply should increase from 28.5 mb/d to
36.8 mb/d. This expansion looks feasible given
the magnitude of Opec's reserves. The
Organization still holds 75% of the world's
proven oil reserves and its current production
capacity utilization rate is 85%. The price of
Brent crude is likely to range between 15-20$/bbl
in nominal terms. 1
Crude oil prices have indeed fluctuated
within this range for the last two years although
this should not be interpreted as proof of an
inherent stability in the oil markets. In fact,
due to the Gulf War in 1990, crude oil prices
shot up to more than 40$/bbl. During the Fall of
1993 these same prices fell to as low as 13$/bbl
following a combination of political and economic
events. Discussions of an imminent lifting of
the UN embargo on Iraqi crude had combined with
market perception that Opec members would not
agree to production quotas that could provide the
floor for oil prices. Consequent to these
developments, many of the funds that had taken
positions in oil decided to get rid of them in
order to pursue more profitable investments. The
recent history of oil prices then, makes it
1 Mehdi, Varzi, "Low Oil Prices - Is Demand the Key?," paper presented in the 7th
Annual Oil Seminar, London, April 1995.
evident how the possibility of further oil price
shocks, or instability in the Middle East, or any
other event with relevant repercussions, could
easily upset a reasonable oil price forecast.
But hedging exists so that companies or
investors whose returns are affected by crude oil
prices are protected by adverse price movements.
If markets were indeed stable and consistent with
the most precise of forecasts, there would be no
need to resort to any hedging activity of any
kind. Therefore, it is against such
uncontrollable price movements described earlier,
as far as crude oil goes, that a shipping company
would be looking to protect itself. Once such
price movements occur, it is reasonable to expect
that prices will sooner or later gravitate
towards the range where supply and demand have
historically met.
To be sure, it is not in the interest of the
market or even Opec to see crude oil prices move
and stay outside the range previously mentioned.
For the oil companies or investors in oil, low
oil prices would mean that exploration and
development projects currently under way in the
North Sea, the Far East or elsewhere would not be
economically feasible. High oil prices, although
welcome in the short term, would also be
undesirable as they would inhibit growth of the
world economy and probably renew interest in
alternative energy sources.2 Opec countries
would also favor a climate of price stability.
2 "Asian Crude Oil and Refined Products Pricing, Australian Research, Mcintosh
Baring," Melbourne, November 1994.
For them, weak oil prices would not help
alleviate the domestic problems most of their
economies are faced with. On the other hand,
high oil prices would also be undesirable for the
same reasons mentioned earlier. (See Appendix 1.)
Having said that, there is one event which
is likely to cause a mini-shock and affect the
oil markets in a significant way. The lifting of
the UN embargo on Iraqi crude exports will have
significant repercussions for the crude oil
market in general and the fuel oil markets in
particular. The difficulty is in predicting
when, not whether, this event will occur. When
it does occur, it will most likely create a mini-
crisis in the oil markets and therefore
interesting hedging opportunities to be taken
advantage of. Oil prices will come down in
anticipation of excess oil. Most likely, oil
producers will gradually limit their exports to
push prices up and increase their revenues to
sustainable levels. Eventually the market will
readjust and the window of opportunity of low oil
prices will close. While it remains open, it
might be interesting examining the advantages of
a long term hedging strategy.
Until then, crude oil is likely to go
through a period of relative price stability
within the 15-20$/bbl range. During this period
of price stability, monitoring the market on a
daily basis might help identify hedging
opportunities based on the fluctuations of crude
oil prices. However, this strategy is unlikely
to prove better than one where the fundamentals
for the price of fuel oil are monitored instead.
b. Fuel Oil Fundamentals
Bunker fuels have recently entered into a
period of tightness relative to the other oil
products. High and low sulphur fuel oil that
used to be sold for 50% or less of the value of
the crude it was derived from, sold for 75% or
more in 1994. 3 This trend is likely to continue
in the near future. The remainder of this
Chapter, will examine the outlook for fuel oil in
general and the market fundamentals which are
pertinent to the three major fuel oil markets.
The prices for fuel oil in Europe, the Americas
and the Far East do not move in unison although
they do have a high degree of correlation.
In the late eighties, the total fuel oil
market was about 730 million tons per year, i.e.
about 20% of the total world-wide oil demand.
About 20% of this quantity was low sulphur fuel
oil with a sulphur content of 1% or less. That
left about 590 million tons of high sulphur fuel
oil, of which 13% went into the bunker markets.
According to the International Energy Agency, the
world-wide demand for bunkers constituted 27% of
the 9.86 mb/d in fuel oil demand in 1992.4 These
figures may not be precise but should serve as an
indication of the size and relative importance of
the fuel oil market.
3 "Bunker's Rising Star Pulls Fuel Oil Out of Twilight," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
(New York: Edward L. Morse, [May 29, 1994D, p. 5.
4 Ibid.
Three basic fuel oil trends are already
evident and will become even more pronounced in
the future. First, is the "whitening of the
barrel." The increase in the world-wide demand
for clean petroleum products has resulted in a
situation where the existing refineries have been
upgrading their installations so as to maximize
the production of clean products and the new
refineries being planned will also be geared
towards the production of more clean and less
dirty, i.e. residual oil, products. Second, is a
trend for the demand of low sulphur fuel oil to
increase to the detriment of high sulphur fuel
oil used for bunkers. Environmental regulations
dictate this change in supply. The third trend
is for the portion of bunker fuel to claim a
larger proportion of the high sulphur product.
Again, environmental regulations inland as well
as the increasing attractiveness of natural gas,
hydroelectric power or coal have contributed to
this trend.
However, probably the most important factor,
likely to influence the price of fuel oil in the
near future has to do with changes in the crude
oil slate that will hit the market in the future.
The eventual resumption of Iraqi oil has the
potential of taking pressure off the fuel oil
market for two reasons. The first, most evident
has already been presented. Difficulties in
accommodating extra crude in a balanced market
will bring world crude oil prices down; product
prices will follow. The second is not as
straight forward. The properties of Iraqi crude
favor the production of more of the dirty by-
products of oil. Therefore, when the UN embargo
is lifted the proportion of high sulphur fuel oil
in the market will increase relative to the other
products thus adding even more downward pressure
to bunker fuel prices. It has been estimated
that fuel oil prices could be brought down by 5
to 10%. 5
Presently, the relative tightness of the
fuel oil markets has much to do with the kind of
crude oil that has replaced Iraqi oil after 1990.
During 1994 and 1995, Saudi Arabia reduced its
Arab Heavy output from 30 to 20% of total
production and replaced it with Arab Light and
Super Light instead of Arab Medium. The
rationale behind this move was to gain market
share in the Far East where simple refining
capacity favors light, sweet crude and to
increase their influence over the price of heavy,
sour crude in a tighter market. 6 Whatever the
case may be, fuel oil prices are likely to remain
strong if Iraqi crude stays off the market and
Saudi Arabia keeps exporting more of its lighter
crude.
The properties of the crude slate world-wide
combined with a number of trends pertaining to
the supply and demand for fuel oil presented
earlier account for the expected tightness of the
5 Roger Diwan, The International Oil Market Medium and Long-Term Outlook,
Stockwatch Quarterly Review (Washington, D.C.: Energy Security Analysis, Inc.,
April 1995]), p. 30.
Sarah A. Emerson, The International Oil Market Medium and Long-Term Outlook,
Stockwatch Quarterly Review (Washington, D.C.: Energy Security Analysis, Inc.,
[April 1995D, p. 9.
fuel oil markets in the immediate future. There
are however other factors which influence fuel
oil prices on regional levels. In 1994, the
strength of the product was also a direct result
of very cold weather conditions in North America
during the first quarter of the year and a
drought in Japan during the third quarter 7 .
Obviously, these events are unpredictable but
specific reference to the three biggest markets
for fuel oil might indicate how fuel oil prices
might react to a sudden change in demand.
According to International Energy Agency
data, during 1992, 21% of bunkers sales took
place in Europe, 21% in North America and 12% in
the Pacific Rim. The prospects for these three
markets are different. European sales should
stay stable but are likely to be affected by the
demand in the Former Soviet Union. Demand is
expected to decline in the United States after an
exceptional year of growth in 1994 due to bad
weather and economic growth in Mexico. Finally,
the Pacific Basin should remain the only growth
region for fuel oil demand, for the next two
years, probably outpacing the region's ability to
produce it. 8
i. Fuel Oil in Europe
In Europe, fuel oil prices depend to a large
extent on developments in the Mediterranean
7 Therefore, the use of hydroelectric power was limited, increasing the fuel oil
demand of power stations. Diwan, The International Oil Market Medium and Long-
Term Outlook, Stockwatch Quarterly Review p. 29.
8 Ibid., p. 30.
basin. The Mediterranean market has become the
fuel oil price maker for all regions and is the
only region where demand is holding ground well
into this year. A number of reasons explain this
development. First, is the change in the world's
crude oil slate mentioned earlier. Second are
developments regarding fuel oil production in the
region. Finally, fuel oil prices largely depend
on the exports coming out of Russia. Erratic
exports in large quantities have depressed fuel
oil price levels in the past and to the extent
that they continue, they are likely to determine
the levels of the fuel oil market in the future.
The supply crunch in the Mediterranean
should be attributed to a significant extent to
the reduction in heavy crude oil coming in from
the Middle East. It has already been mentioned
how the Saudis have emphasized exports of their
crudes to the Far East where prices are more
favorable for refineries. At the same time, the
surge in North Sea production has resulted in a
reduction of fuel oil coming out of the North
European refineries since refined North Sea oil
favors the yield of lighter products. The
resulting tightening of the Mediterranean market
is expected to keep upward pressure on the world
residual prices. 9 This pressure however can be
mitigated by the Iranian barrels displaced from
the American and Far Eastern customers I0 .
Therefore, prices this coming winter should not
9 Ibid., p. 31.
10 Petroleum Market Intelligence (New York: Edward L. Morse, [August 31, 1995])
p. 3.
reach the high levels attained in 1994 but should
be close to historical high levels.
Production of fuel oil is expected to
decline and exert upward pressure on fuel oil
prices although this decline will not be as
substantial as in previous years. Production of
fuel oil has declined by about 160,000 bbls/day
over the last two years. During 1995 and 1996,
production is expected to decline by about 20 to
30,000 bbls/day. However, this trend is not
likely to continue in the future. The pace of
fuel oil production withdrawal has almost stopped
in Europe. Even more important in the long term
is the increasing use of natural gas. This
cleaner source of energy has been making
substantial inroads into the power generation
market in recent years and is expected to
continue to erode fuel oil's market share. Over
the 1995 to 1998 period, the most significant
substitution program is expected to take place in
Italy which also has the largest fuel oil market
in Europe. Greater use of Algerian gas is
forecast to slash the country's fuel oil
requirement from 410,000 bbls/day to a little
over 270,000 bbls/day. Over the next ten years
gas is also expected to make heavy inroads into
the fuel oil market in Greece, Spain, Portugal
and Turkey.11 This is a long term trend however
that one should keep in mind; it is not likely to
significantly affect the fuel oil market over the
next two years. In the longer term however, it
11 Varzi, 'Low Oil Prices - Is Demand the Key?"
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seems that the tightness of the fuel oil market
in Europe will probably ease.
A critical factor which is expected to
dictate what fuel oil prices will do in Europe
will be developments in Russia and the Former
Soviet Union. Russia remains the wild card in
the fuel oil market. This role is heightened by
the fact that most of the exported volume
surfaces in the key Mediterranean market via the
Black Sea. There is a direct relationship
between Russian fuel oil exports, Mediterranean
residual fuel oil prices and world residual
prices. However, Russian fuel oil exports are
increasingly seasonal and fuel oil prices in the
Mediterranean and beyond will increasingly
reflect this seasonality as long as global fuel
oil fundamentals remain tight. 12 (See Appendix 2.)
ii. Fuel Oil in the Americas
The biggest decline in fuel oil demand since
the latter part of the 1980's has occurred in the
United States which also happens to have the
world's most competitive gas market. Since 1988,
fuel oil demand has declined by nearly 25% and
there is every prospect of further declines in
the years to come. This year, fuel oil import
demand in the US could decline to less than
1mb/d. This would be the lowest level in 50
years. 13 Having said that, production is
expected to decline by 90,000 bbls/day in the
12 Diwan, The International Oil Market Medium and Long-Term Outlook. Stockwatch
Quarterly Review p. 31.
13 Varzi, "Low Oil Prices - Is Demand the Key?"
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Americas during 1995. Cracking capacity will be
added in Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia in 1995
and this can mitigate the price effects of
declining demand since there will be less fuel
oil produced too. 14
Therefore, fuel oil markets in the Americas
are not expected to change significantly. The
tightness in Europe can also affect prices in the
Americas as extra barrels can be exported to
Europe in arbitrage opportunities. More
recently, fuel oil prices have gained ground
reflecting a revival of incremental utility
interest into the winter. The drop in domestic
demand due to the switch-over to natural gas this
year should keep prices in balance until cold
weather arrives. As the winter approaches,
rising natural gas prices could make fuel oil
more competitive.15 (See Appendix 3.)
iii. Fuel Oil in the Far East
Historically, the Far East has been a net
importer of heavy products such as fuel oil.
During 1990, the regions net import requirements
of dirty products were 600,000bbls/d.1 6 During
1995 however, supply and demand have come into
balance and the residual market was tight by only
50,000 bbls/d. An important feature of the Asian
oil market is its heavy reliance on the middle
14 Diwan, The International Oil Market Medium and Long-Term Outlook, Stockwatch
Quarterly Review p. 33.
15 Petroleum Market Intelligence (New York: Edward L. Morse, [August 31, 1995])
p. 5.16 They imported around 1.2mb/d of dirty products against exports of less than
600,000b/d.
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distillates. Kerosene, jet fuel and diesel
comprise 44% of the barrel versus an average of
39% in the rest of the world. The incremental
demand for the barrel is for 58% middle
distillate and for less than 10% heavy fuel oil.
Only highly sophisticated hydrocracking
refineries can meet this pattern of demand and
the number of refining projects that will come on
stream in the future is uncertain.
Developments in the future will depend on
whether or not refinery plans to boost cracking
capacity will materialize. If they do, the
increase in the production of low value fuel oil
means that much of it will be exported. If they
don't, expensive clean products, mainly diesel
will be imported and the growth in the supply of
fuel oil will not outpace the growth of demand.
Supply from the Middle East should keep coming in
the region attracted by high prices. Middle East
oil availability should also be on the rise,
pushed by rising production and higher domestic
prices which will limit demand.
Two more developments are expected to become
factors that will affect fuel oil prices in the
Far East. The first is that environmental
awareness has also taken root in the Far East.
Fuel oil sulphur specifications have tightened.
Secondly, and this is important for the scope of
this study, oil prices in Asia exhibit lower
volatility than elsewhere in the world. The
lower volatility is attributed to regional trade
and hedging issues, the near absence of price
speculators, price reporting methodologies and
relative regulation of markets. (See second table
Appendix 6.) Asian oil prices typically exhibit a
lagged response to Atlantic basin oil price
moves.
In conclusion, a company considering a
bunker price hedging strategy should at least
track the following developments relating to the
oil markets. To the extent that fuel oil prices
are affected by the price of crude oil, the fuel
oil price outlook is likely to be relatively
stable in the future. One event which is certain
to interrupt this stability is the lifting of the
United Nations embargo on Iraqi crude oil
exports. Most analysts think this is not likely
to happen before 1997, due to the 1996 US
presidential elections. Increased exports from
the Arabian Gulf are going to have a temporary
effect on the oil markets until Opec and other
producing countries readjust to lower quotas.
Low crude oil prices are not to the detriment of
many of Opec's economies.
Short term fluctuations on crude oil prices
will certainly occur in the meantime. However,
during this time it would be better for a hedging
strategy to center around fuel oil price
developments occurring because of fundamental
developments in this product's market. Events in
the three major markets of the product in Europe,
the Americas and the Far East should be examined
against the background of two major predictable
trends. The first is "the whitening of the
barrel" due to increased demand for clean
petroleum products. The second is the effect of
resumed Iraqi crude oil exports in the
composition of the crude slate hitting the world
markets.
In regional terms, the fuel oil market in
Europe is expected to remain tight in the short
to medium term future. Again, Iraqi oil sales,
limits in production withdrawal and the potential
use of alternative sources of energy, namely gas,
are predictable factors that should affect the
European market. The uncertainty regarding
Russian oil exports has the potential of defining
price trends. In the Americas, demand has been
on the decline but export opportunities due to
the tightness in the European basin should keep
prices in a relative equilibrium. Weather
patterns and the outlook of gas prices comprise
the unpredictable factors that will affect fuel
oil prices. Finally in the Far East, much
depends on the addition of refining capacity. If
refining projects are completed, fuel oil
produced regionally should become cheaper.
However, this development will take place over a
long time. An important fact for this study is
that fuel oil prices in the Far East will
continue to lack volatility. The table in the
following page should summarize the findings of
this chapter on market fundamentals.
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Predictable Events
-Iraqi Exports affecting
crude oil prices and
slate.
-The "whitening of the
barrel."
-Composition of crude
oil slate.
-Limits on production
withdrawal.
-Use of alternative
energy sources (gas.)
-Declining demand.
-Arbitrage opportunities
to tight European
markets.
-Inherent lack of
volatility.
Unpredictable
Even ts
-- ??
-Russian
Exports.
-Gas prices.
-Weather
patterns.
-Refining
capacity.
General
Europe
Americas
Far East
Chapter 3: Hedging Instruments
There are numerous ways for a shipping company
to put together a hedging program. Hedging
instruments however, differ in sophistication and
structure. The purpose of this chapter is to
present the main tools that make hedging possible
and explain the advantages or the characteristics of
each one. Futures are the easier and most liquid
instruments but do not eliminate basis risk, the
price differential between bunker delivered at a
ship's manifold and paper oil. Over-the-counter
instruments like swaps and options are less liquid
but can match closely the particular hedging
strategy of a shipping company. Following this
discussion it will be possible to define the
particular instruments that will be more suitable
for the strategy of the Eletson Corporation given a
favorable pricing environment.
a. Futures Contracts
The most basic paper oil instrument that
hedgers, speculators or arbitrageurs can trade is
the futures contract. Therefore, the heart of the
paper oil market beats in the three exchanges that
trade futures contracts. West Texas Intermediate
crude oil, heating oil and regular unleaded gasoline
are traded in the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX). North Sea Brent crude oil, heavy fuel oil
and gasoil are traded in the International Petroleum
Exchange of London (IPE). The Singapore
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) trades fuel
oil and crude oil.
An example of a futures contract:
Now
Fears price
increase
(spot bunkers
cost $72/mt)
Future
Prices increase
(spot bunkers
cost $87/mt)
Buys Brent
futures at $20/bl
Sells Brent
futures at
21.50/bl
Buys spot bunkers
at $87/mt
Makes profit of
$1.50/bl on
futures
Bunker purchase
is more expensive
by $15/mt
Net cost is: $76.80/mt
Not all futures contracts are successful. A
successful contract has to satisfy three
requirements. The first is price volatility.
Insufficient price movement in a product means there
is little need for a futures market. The growth of
the paper oil market is a direct result of the
commodity's price volatility. The second is
standard quality. It must be possible to define a
standard quality on which delivery and price are
based. Lastly, a futures market can only succeed if
there are a large number of participants to provide
the necessary liquidity. The most liquid contracts
are those of crude oil in the NYMEX and the IPE.
This makes sense. Crude oil is one of the most
heavily traded commodities. The fuel oil contract
of the IPE and the heating oil contract of the NYMEX
are successful contracts although less liquid than
their crude oil counterparts. The SIMEX fuel oil
contract is illiquid and is probably going to be
discontinued.17 (See Appendix 4.)
Before venturing further to the suitability of
a futures contract in covering a hedging
requirement, it would be useful explaining what a
futures contract is and how it is traded. A futures
contract is a commitment to buy or sell a standard
lot of a specified commodity at a certain time in
the future. Each lot of futures is of a quantity
and quality laid down by the exchange concerned.
The contract is for a specified time, i.e. a
calendar month. Each month will cease to trade on a
specified date and if nothing is done with the
contract prior to that date it will become a
17 Singapore,' Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (New York: Edward L. Morse,
[September 25, 1995]), p. 8.
physical contract to take delivery or to deliver
according to the contract rules. Very few contracts
run through to delivery. The vast majority, more
than 99%, are sold or bought back before the expiry
of the contract. (See Appendix 5.)
Once a contract has been traded on the floor of
the exchange, its details are registered with the
clearing house. This organization guarantees the
financial performance of all futures contracts and
deals with all the administrative aspects of futures
trading. The clearing house effectively steps in
between buyer and seller so that each has a contract
with the clearing house and their dealings with each
other are at an end.
Financial dealings with the clearing house take
place every day. As soon as a contract is traded, a
deposit or an initial margin has to be paid. The
amount of this deposit varies from contract to
contract but is usually around $2,000 per contract
on NYMEX, $500-1,000 on the IPE and $500 on SIMEX.
In addition to the deposit, a variation margin is
calculated for every unclosed futures contract,
based on the settlement price for the previous day's
trading. Any difference between the value of a
contract as traded and the market value at the
settlement is payable to the clearing house if it is
a debit and to the client if a credit. These
margins are the means by which the clearing house is
able to guarantee the financial performance of the
contracts.
All dealings with the exchange are done through
a broker. The commissions paid to a broker are
negotiable. They can be quoted in one of two ways,
either as an inclusive commission of Sy or as $x
plus fees. In order to compare the two prices, it
would be necessary to determine the current market
costs. The broker is responsible for paying the
market registration fees, the clearing fees and the
floor brokerage fees. He also has to cover his own
costs. So, the inclusive commission should be the
same as $x plus the fees mentioned above.
The following example illustrates how hedging
works for a shipowner who wishes to protect himself
against an adverse bunker price movement. If he
knows he will have to buy 5,000 tonnes of bunkers in
the future and fears that prices will be
significantly higher by then, he could buy his
bunkers now at $72/mt but he would have nowhere to
store the oil. He can buy futures instead. If he
chooses to buy Brent crude oil futures for delivery
in a future month at $20.00/bbl, feeling that they
will give him the best protection, he would need to
buy 34,000 barrels to cover his 5,000 tonnes of fuel
oil requirement. Suppose that when the time comes
for the shipowner to buy his bunkers, his fears have
come true and fuel oil prices have indeed increased.
So have crude oil prices, although not in tandem.
The shipowner will buy his physical material at a
cost of $87.00/MT and sell his futures at
$21.50/bbl. Effectively, he has offset his loss in
the physical market, since he was right predicting
the price increase, with a gain in the futures
market. His futures profit of $1.50/bbl has reduced
his net cost of fuel by $10.20/mt to $76.80/mt, less
costs.
There are two important observations to make in
this example. First, is that the shipowner managed
to reduce his bunker costs because he correctly
predicted the increase in prices. Obviously that is
not easy to do. Had prices actually decreased, the
shipowner would have lost out on this transaction if
he chose to close out, i.e. sell his futures
contracts, instead of rolling them forward.
Obviously, he would have bought bunkers at a cheaper
price and that could offset the paper loss but he
would have purchased his bunkers at a better price
anyway. Therefore, futures lock in a purchase price
and do not guarantee a real gain. Neither do they
prevent a real loss. What actually happens depends
on whether or not one has the correct view on the
market's trends. This is what speculators do, not
hedgers.
The second observation is that the shipowner
chose to use crude oil futures in order to hedge his
fuel oil exposure. Furthermore, he probably did not
get too concerned about the fact that the place he
needed to get physical delivery of his bunkers was
different to the one where the crude oil futures
contract would stipulate delivery if it ever became
a physical cargo. This last observation leads to
the discussion of basis risk, the biggest
disadvantage of futures contracts.
The relationship between crude oil price and
product prices is extremely complex and
inconsistent. Factors such as location,
seasonality, weather, refinery capacity and product
slate logistics, stocks and regulatory restrictions
determine the movements in product prices as the
crude price varies. Hence, any consumer of products
faces a price risk which moves out of step and
without a predictable correlation to the crude
price. This is the basis risk. (See Appendix 6.)
So, the actual price volatility of individual
products is often very different from that of the
underlying crude. Now, among the major products of
crude oil, fuel oil has the poorest correlation to
crude oil, mainly because the influences on fuel oil
include its competitor fuels such as coal and
natural gas. Such factors can have a dramatic
effect on fuel oil demand. As a general rule of
thumb, a correlation of less than 80% is considered
unsuitable for a hedge. The correlation of fuel to
crude oil is closer to 60%.
Basis risk is more of a problem when a fuel oil
hedge is done with a crude oil futures position like
in the example earlier. However, basis risk exists
even when fuel or heating oil futures are used to
hedge bunker purchases. Fuel oil prices do not move
in unison everywhere and qualities are not uniform.
The liquid IPE fuel oil contract can not serve as a
perfect hedge for bunker purchases.
One way to mitigate the effects of basis risk
is with the use of Alternative Delivery Procedures
(ADPs) or the Exchange For Physicals (EFPs). Most
of the oil contracts have adopted a delivery
procedure to match as closely as possible the local
physical market conditions. In all markets, once
the contract has expired, the clearing house matches
up the buyers and sellers with outstanding
positions. Buyers must then take delivery from the
seller to whom they have been allocated under the
rules of the exchange concerned. The only
exceptions are the ADPs and the EFPs. In the first
of these, the buyer and seller, having been matched
up by the exchange, can agree to deliver under
different conditions, for example in a different
place, or even to deliver a different product. In
this case, they notify the exchange that they are
doing an ADP and their delivery can take place as
agreed between them. The exchange and clearing
house will not however guarantee the fulfilment of
the contract if it is made under an ADP.
Under an EFP, buyer and seller again agree to a
physical delivery outside the rules of the exchange
but in this case they make the arrangements before
they are matched by the exchange and notify the
exchange that the agreement has been made. Their
futures positions are then closed by the exchange
and again, the exchange and clearing house no longer
guarantee the contracts. Theoretically, both the
ADPs and the EFPs would make it easier for a
shipowner to match his demand for physical product
to the futures position he has chosen to take.
However, this added flexibility would rather
complicate things. There is no good reason that
justifies connecting the physical bunkering
operation to the use of paper instruments. In any
case, other available tools increase the flexibility
of a hedging program without complicating the
logistics.
One more potential problem when hedging with
futures is the time horizon of the contracts.
Contracts trade for twelve months forward. This
might be inconvenient for shipowners who might wish
to hedge their exposures beyond this time period.
Furthermore, futures contracts for the distant
months tend to be illiquid. The trading of large
volumes then becomes problematic. Other hedging
instruments that will be examined later can offer
price protection for up to five years. Finally, the
costs of operating a futures hedge although not
significant, might be of concern. Since positions
are marked to market as explained earlier, the whole
operation can create budgetary problems and have
repercussions for the cash management of a company.
Before discussing other hedging instruments it
would be worth mentioning another way of hedging
one's exposure to the volatility of bunker prices,
similar to the use of futures. The forward contract
is similar to a futures contract in that both are a
commitment to buy or sell a specific quantity of a
specified product in named locations at a fixed time
in the future. However, the forward contract is a
private contract between two parties that reaches
maturity and becomes a physical cargo on a specified
delivery date. For purposes of fuel oil hedging,
forward contracts do not pose the same problems with
futures as far as basis risk goes. Theoretically,
they could be contracts for the delivery of the same
kind of fuel oil that needs to be bought by a vessel
on a particular date in a specified place. However,
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this physical end of their structure makes it
problematic to tie them in with a company's hedging
strategy.18 A shipowner may not know in advance
where his ship is going to be at any given time.
Consequently, he can not take the risk associated
with being at the receiving end of a mature,
physical, forward contract.
Over the last few years there has been a rapid
growth of similar instruments traded off the
exchanges or "over the counter." These products
were introduced initially by the major US investment
banks, or Wall Street refiners, as they became
known, but are now offered by a large number of
traders and others including some of the major oil
companies. These derivative instruments are widely
used on the financial markets and the banks saw oil
as being a commodity very similar to money. The
rapid growth in their use amongst shipping companies
is in part attributed to the lack of liquid futures
contracts in fuel oil.
Swaps and options, the fundamental forms of
these instruments, will be discussed in greater
detail (see also Appendix 7.) However, they can be
combined in numerous ways, to produce more "exotic"
structures which can cover unusual price risks. The
main advantage then, of these over-the-counter
contracts is their flexibility. They do not have
strict parameters and can be tailored to perfectly
fit a shipowner's requirements. They offer
shipowners "a higher level of precision giving them
the ability to hedge the price of the fuel they lift
18 John Hull, Introduction to Futures and Options Markets, (Englewodd Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1991), p. 38.
in the markets they lift it. This eliminates both
location and product basis risk." 19 The majority of
over-the-counter contracts settle against the
monthly average prices as quoted in Platt's European
Marketscan. This is published daily and the most
commonly used references are the following:
High Sulphur Fuel Oil 3.5% Barges FOB Rotterdam,
High Sulphur Fuel Oil 180 or 380 cst FOB Singapore,
High Sulphur Fuel Oil cst FOB Arab Gulf,
High Sulphur Fuel Oil Resid 3S (3% sulphur) US Gulf
Coast Waterborne and
High Sulphur Fuel Oil No 6 3% CIF New York.
Other locations can be hedged against Platt's
Oilgram "Bunkerwire."
b. Swaps
The most widely used instrument is the swap,
where a shipowner can buy fixed price fuel oil for a
given period and volume at a fixed price. For
example, a shipowner might agree to buy bunker fuel
for a month in the future at $77/mt. If the average
price of fuel in that month is higher than $77/mt,
say $89/mt, the shipowner will be paid the
difference of $12/mt. If however, the average price
is lower than the $77/mt mark, the shipowner will
have to compensate his counterparty by the
corresponding amount. The deal with the market
maker will be simply financial, money will be
transferred to whichever party has made a profit.
19 Ramsey El-Fakir, "The Art of Stabilizing Bunker Prices," Seatrade Review, May
1992, p. 67.
The bunker fuel will be taken from the normal
supplier in the normal way, but the buyer will have
fixed the price ahead of time. Thus, in the
previous example, if physical oil is bought at
$89/mt, the buyer will be paying $12/mt more for his
physical supply. This loss will be counterbalanced
by the gain from the swap.
The difference between a futures deal and a
swap is that the latter is negotiated with a counter
party and is not a standard contract. Basis risk
can often be reduced or eliminated with a swap,
provided that the counterparty is agreeable in using
the terms at which the physical trading is normally
done. Large fuel oil swap markets have surfaced
throughout Europe, Asia and the United States. It
is now possible to hedge 180 or 380 cst fuel oil in
almost any market for up to three years. In some
markets it is even possible to hedge out to five to
ten years. The number of brokers doing swaps deals
has also grown from a handful to over twenty five.
The market has become very transparent and pricing
tactics include open outcry conference calling where
brokers have to quote their best price at the same
time.2 0 In addition to the price references
mentioned earlier, swaps can also be quoted based on
Mediterranean, United States West Coast and Japan
fuel oil prices.21
20 "Swaps Market Matures as Brokers Bring Transparency," Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly (New York: Edward L. Morse, [May 1, 1995]), p. 2.
21 "Bunker Fuel Swaps and Options, BP's New Solutions to Your Pricing Risk,"
London, 1992.
An example of a swap contract:
Now
Fears price
increase
(spot bunkers
cost $74/mt)
Fu ture
Prices increase
(spot bunkers
cost $89/mt)
Enters swap at
$77/mt
Buys spot bunkers
at $89/mt
Gets compensated
for difference
Pays $89/mt
Earns $12/mt
Net cost is: $77/mt
It could be argued that an advantage of futures
over swaps is that a futures position can be
adjusted according to the changing views of the
market, whereas a swap is generally less flexible.
For example, in the regulated exchange, it is easier
to close out a futures position or even roll it over
when market trends indicate that a loss is imminent.
A swap does not offer the same opportunities for
readjustments once an initial position has been
agreed with a counterparty. The question really is
to what extend a hedge should be tradable. Swaps
hedges are not easily tradable. This is not to say
that they are totally inflexible when priced.
Instead of fixing a price for the whole quantity of
oil at the time the deal is agreed, the two parties
can agree to fix it over a specified period of time,
e.g. a month. Thus someone agreeing to buy 5,000
tonnes of bunkers might agree to price it over a
month, in lots of not less than 500 tonnes. He can
then choose any day over the month agreed to fix the
price of 500 tonnes or more until he has priced the
whole 5,000 tonnes. Once established, the deal will
operate like a normal swap deal and will be
reversed in a similar way when the physical oil is
delivered.
In conclusion, swaps give 100% upside
protection but expose the hedger to all the downside
of the market. Therefore, they are best used when
prices are at market lows where the downside risk is
much less than the upside risk. However, if a
shipowner wants to retain some of the advantage of
lower prices he could enter into a participating
swap where he would give up part of the downside and
participate in lower prices. Obviously then, the
swap will be done at a higher rate. For example, if
swap levels are quoted at $77/mt, the shipowner can
agree to a $79/mt, 50% participating swap. The
probability of a loss becomes greater for him but if
physical prices remain below the $79/mt mark he only
pays for half the difference between the lower
average price and the swap mark. He participates in
the potential profits of his counterparty and limits
his downside.
c. Options
Options are another significant over-the-
counter hedging instrument. All the active oil
futures contracts have options and the companies
involved in the over-the-counter market also offer a
number of option packages. An option gives the
buyer the right but not the obligation to buy or
sell a commodity at a specified price (the strike
price) within a certain time period. A premium is
paid by the buyer to the seller. There are two
types of options, a call and a put. A call option
gives the buyer the right to buy and a put option,
the right to sell. The fundamental difference
between the use of futures and options is that the
former "are designed to neutralize risk by fixing
the price that the hedger will pay or receive for
the underlying asset. Options contracts however,
provide insurance in that a hedger can protect
against an adverse price movement in the future
while still being able to benefit from favorable
An example of a call option contract:
Now
Fears price
increase
(spot bunkers
cost $72/mt)
Fu ture
Prices increase
Buys call option
at $78/mt
Pays premium of
$2/mt
Exercises option Gets compensated
by $4/mt
(spot bunkers
cost $82/mt)
Buys spot bunkers (has paid premium
at $82/mt upfront)
Net cost is: $80/mt
price movements." 22 The financial consequences of
the use of options are magnified. "Good outcomes
become very good, while bad outcomes become very
bad. "23
Thus, the buyer of a $78 fuel oil call option
for a future month has the right to buy fuel oil at
$78 at any time between the time the option is
bought and the time of its expiry. If fuel oil does
not reach $78 the option will simply expire
worthless, in which case the buyer has lost the
premium he has paid but nothing else. The buyer can
not lose more than the premium. If fuel oil rises
above $78 he will exercise his option, giving him a
long position on the fuel oil futures market at $78.
This is then treated in the same way as any other
futures position. He can also sell the option back
to the market at any time since, as opposed to a
swap, an option is a traded instrument in its own
right. The type of option in the previous example
is also called a cap since it places a limit to what
the buyer might have to pay. A put option is the
reverse of a call and is also called a floor. The
buyer of a $78 fuel oil January put option will
exercise it if Brent falls below $78 but not
otherwise.
The buyer of an option has rights but not
obligations. It therefore follows that the seller
of an option has obligations but no rights. An
option will only be exercised if it is in the
buyer's favor which by definition means it is
22 John Hull, Introduction to Futures and Options Markets, (Englewodd Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1991), p. 8.
SIbid., p. 11.
against the seller. The seller of an option
receives the premium which represents his maximum
profit. If the buyer exercises the option, the
seller will take the other side of the futures
position created. It is therefore important that
the seller of an option takes cover on the market
for any adverse movements. This can be in the form
of a futures position or a physical position.
Exchange options are defined in a similar way
to the futures contracts. There is a specified
expiry date for each month and defined strike
prices. Over the counter options can be tailored
more specifically to the buyer's requirements.
Options are usually treated as an insurance policy
to cover undesirable turns of events. If a
shipowner strongly believes that the fuel oil market
is going to rise, he might enter into a swap or open
a futures position, but if he does not think it will
but is worried that it might, he can buy an option
in case it does. He can always sell it later.
In buying the option, the shipowner will
specify the reference quotation, the duration of the
contract, the settlement periods and the quantities
per period, the preferred currency and the ceiling
price. The counterparty will then specify the
premium. Option premiums vary with market
conditions. They are dependent on various factors,
the most important being time to expiry and market
volatility. The theoretical value of an option can
be calculated from the various known factors such as
the historical volatility, the time to expiry, the
price, interest rates and so on, but the market
price can be very different as it takes account of
expected volatility and supply and demand.
Put and call options can be combined in numerous
ways depending on the needs of the shipowner or the
imagination of his broker. A simple combination is
that of a cap and a floor. The attractive feature
of this arrangement is that the so called collar is
usually structured to involve no premium payments.
A shipowner buys a cap worth $x and sells a floor
worth the same in order to offset the premiums. For
example, a zero-cost collar could give a $78/mt cap
in exchange for a $70/mt floor. If the market is
above $78/mt, the hedge provider would compensate
the shipowner 100%. If the market price is between
$78/mt and $70/mt, no payments would be made by
either party and if the market is below $70/mt the
shipowner would pay the difference to the hedge
provider. Collars work well in a low market, where
historically low levels can be achieved on the cap,
but they should only be viewed as a form of disaster
insurance as the bands are by necessity fairly wide
and the protection is limited to major market moves.
For a cash rich company which can take the day to
day swings on the market, but would be adversely
affected by the price increases similar to those
following the Gulf War, they would be the best
hedging tool. 24
24 Bunker Fuel Swaps and Options, BP's New Solutions to Your Pricing Risk,"
London, 1992.
An example of a collar:
Now
Fears severe
price increase
(spot bunkers
cost $72/mt)
Buys call option
at $78/mt
Pays premium of
$2/mt
Sells put option
at $66/mt
Earns premium of
$2/mt
Future
Prices increase
(spot bunkers
cost $86/mt)
Exercises option
Buys spot bunkers
at $86/mt
net cost is:
Gets compensated
by $8/mt
(has paid premium
upfront)
Put option
expires worthless
$78/mt
d. Swaptions
As the market and its users have become more
sophisticated, a whole battery of flexible, new
structures has emerged. Most of these products are
simply imaginative variations of the basic hedging
tools mentioned above but one of the most common
additions is a swaption. A swaption is simply the
option on a swap and it can be bought or sold. It
can either be a call swaption, the right to buy a
swap, or a put swaption, the right to sell a swap.
For example, a shipowner could buy a call swaption
with a strike level of $70/mt for 1996, expiring on
December 31st, 1995. For this swaption he would be
paying a premium. He would then be able to exercise
his right by the end of 1995 and enter into a swap
for 1996 at $70/mt. If he chooses not to exercise
this right, the option would expire worthless.
Since shipping companies need to purchase fuel
oil in the future, they can take advantage of any
product that will place them in the position of
holding paper fuel oil now. If prices increase,
paper fuel oil sold later will generate a profit.
If they decrease, the physical purchase at a lower
price will counterbalance the paper loss.
Consequently, a frequent transaction involves a
shipping company selling a put swaption, i.e.
selling the right to be put into a swap at a level,
volume and time period fixed now on a particular
date in the future.
An example of a swaption:
Now
Feels market
overestimates
chance of price
decrease
(spot bunkers
cost $74/mt)
Fu ture
Prices decrease
Sells put
swaption at
$70/mt
Earns premium of
$2/mt
Option is
exercised
Has to compensate
counterparty by
$4/mt
(spot bunkers
cost $66/mt)
Buys spot bunkers
at $66/mt
net cost is: $70/mt
For example, a shipowner might sell a put
swaption for 1996 at $70/mt, exercisable on December
31st, 1995 for a volume of 5,000 mt per month. On
December 31st 1995, the buyer will have the right to
put the shipowner into a swap as above. Because
this option has a premium value, the buyer will pay
the shipowner a fee per ton up front (option
premiums are typically payable up front). If prices
increase subsequently, the shipowner will have
generated revenues in premiums. If prices fall, he
will be subsidizing the buyer of the swaption but he
will be balancing out this loss by buying cheaper
fuel. The premium generating capacity of swaptions
means that they can be embedded into other hedging
strategies as a means of subsidizing the cost.
Three of the most common strategies, extendables,
double-ups and caps for swaption are presented
below, although double-ups and extendables lost much
of the popularity they gained in 1994 to straight
one through five year swap contracts.2 5
An extendable swap is where the shipowner
enters into a swap and gives his counterparty the
right to extend the swap for a further period at the
same price. If a shipowner can purchase a $70/mt
swap for one year but has targeted a level of
$68/mt, he could sell an option to his counterparty;
the right to extend the swap to cover one more equal
time period for an equal volume of fuel. By doing
this effectively he is reducing his swap level for
the first time period with the premium he has
generated on the option. The same principle applies
to the double-up. The only difference is that the
25 "Swaps Market Matures as Brokers Bring Transparency,' Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly (New York: Edward L. Morse, [May 1, 1995]), p. 2.
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shipowner is giving his counterparty the right to
double the volume of the swap at the same price.
This will achieve a reduced level on the swap. In
the caps for swaption strategy, the shipowner can
purchase a call option and offset the premium by
selling a swaption for a future period. Swaptions
are probably the most versatile hedging instrument.
As with any option, when volatility levels are high,
the option has more premium value. Buying caps then
works against the shipowner whereas selling
swaptions works for him.
There are more exotic, customized hedging
instruments but it makes sense to stay away from
them unless there is a very clear investment side
justification for their use. Dealers make more
profit selling cutting edge instruments for which
competition is less intense. Unless a company can
explain why an exotic instrument protects its
investment opportunities better than a plain-vanilla
one, it is better to go with a plain-vanilla. 2 6
2 Kenneth A. Froote et al., "A Framework For Risk Management," Harvard Business
Review, November-December 1994, p. 102.
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Chapter 4: Hedging Bunkers in Shipping: Why and How?
It has already been demonstrated how crude and
fuel oil prices are likely to be influenced in the
near future. Crude oil prices have been going
through a period of relative stability which is
expected to continue into the future until Iraqi oil
enters the market. As for the fuel oil market, it
is likely to remain strong for as long as the crude
oil slate favors the production of the lighter by-
products of oil. Developments in the three major
markets of the product already presented serve as
indications of the more specific trends evolving
regionally. Subsequent to this analysis, it was
shown how a shipping company could protect itself
against adverse bunker price movements. A number of
hedging mechanisms allow for increased flexibility
in devising a hedging strategy.
This Chapter will present an attempt to
formulate such a strategy. It will consist of two
parts. The first one will introduce the argument
for the usefulness of hedging and present the
necessary conditions under which such a strategy
should be pursued. Reference will be made to the
hedging strategies undertaken by transportation
companies. The second part of this chapter will
attempt to formulate a strategy suited specifically
to the needs of a shipping company.
a. Hedging as a Corporate Strategy
Hedging strategies need not only apply to the
need of a shipping company to protect itself from
bunker price volatility. The same hedging
instruments presented earlier can also be applied
towards the protection from foreign exchange or
interest rate risk. Therefore the question that
needs to be addressed first is a rather generic one.
What is the need of a company for a hedging program?
Nobel prize winner Merton Miller comes up with
a rudimentary answer to this basic question.
According to him, commodity risk need not be managed
at the corporate level because it is managed by the
very structure of efficient and well-functioning
capital markets. Thus investors buy shipping shares
for example, because they want to embrace freight
rate risk. They can then hedge that risk by
diversifying their investment portfolio between
commodities and other investments. Accordingly,
efforts by shipping company managers to hedge
freight, exchange, interest rate or energy price
risk deprive investors of the risk they are trying
to take by buying the stock themselves.
This view assumes that shareholders have as
much information about the risks faced by a company
as the company's management. This is not always the
case. A shipping company might be faced with a type
of risk that investors do not know about. If the
company's management thinks that this risk can be
hedged to the benefit of the company, it should go
ahead and hedge it. The primary goal of a manager
is to enhance the value of the company stock for the
shareholders and hedging strategies that the manager
thinks will protect the company's equity or cash
flow should be pursued.
Miller would argue against such action because
it would affect the risk profile the investor is
looking for in buying the company's stock in the
first place. The investor who wishes to include
particular risks in his portfolio can do it himself
by picking commodities or other investments. But
an investment in a company should also be an
investment in the company's ability to manage the
risks it is faced with. If hedging is a financial
policy that enhances risk management effectiveness,
it should be pursued. Miller's view also ignores
commissions and other transaction costs which are
less expensive per dollar of hedging for large
transactions done by companies than for small ones
by investors.
Kenneth Froote, David Scharfstein and Keith
Stein introduce another concept in hedging theory.
They accept the Modigliani and Miller position that
a company grows by investment in and correct
management of its assets. The overarching purpose
of hedging then is to "ensure that a company has the
cash available to make value-enhancing
investments... Financial policy (including hedging)
[is] critical in enabling companies to make valuable
investments." The extension of this principle is
that hedging "lets companies transfer funds from
situations in which they have an excess supply to
situations where they have a shortage. In essence,
it allows companies to borrow from themselves."
Subsequently, hedging becomes a desirable strategy
for a company whose need for investment is not
synchronous to its availability of funds.
Managers who adopt this approach should ask
themselves two questions: How sensitive are cash
flows to risk variables and how sensitive are
investment opportunities to those risk variables.
The answer will help managers understand whether the
supply of funds and the demand for funds are
naturally aligned or whether they can be better
aligned through risk management.2 7
Using the example of an oil company, Froote et
al. make a surprising statement against oil producer
hedging in stating that there is less reason for an
oil company to hedge than there is for a
multinational pharmaceutical company. The reason
for this is that the latter is exposed to currency
risk which is not directly correlated with the
company's investment needs, whereas the risk of the
oil company is directly correlated with the need to
invest. For an oil company the supply of funds
tends to match the demand for funds, even if the
company does not actively manage risk. Investments
need to be made when oil prices rise and in such an
environment revenues from expensive oil generate the
required funds. The problem with this analysis is
that it assumes that the market is by definition
right about the desirability of investing in oil
production. According to it, when oil prices are
down, companies should invest less in exploration
and production. This is equivalent to saying that
investment programs into the future should be based
on the present price outlook and that future
production need not be hedged today since the latter
27 Ibid., p. 98.
is most likely to differ from the ultimate "real" or
spot price of the future.
It is not clear what Froote et al would say
about the case of a shipping firm. In the cyclical
shipping industry a company that sees little need in
hedging because it invests in capital when freight
rates are buoyant and ship prices inflated would
probably go bankrupt. Investment in new ships
should not be undertaken when healthy freight rates
generate sufficient revenues. Shipowners who buy
ships in rising markets usually find themselves in
trouble. So, in the case of shipping at least,
history disproves academic theory in that success is
probable when capital investment is not justified by
the current level of operating profits.
So far, this analysis challenges the positions
of two schools of thought. First, Miller's position
that companies which hedge negate the risk that
investors are looking for when investing in them,
does not account for the growth of the commodities
markets which offer the ground for direct risk
taking opportunities. Secondly, the position of
Froote et al. that if a company's supply of funds
matches its demand it need not hedge is also
problematic in that it makes the wrong assumptions
about the workings of certain markets, especially
cyclical ones. Hedging is a desirable strategy when
managers can effectively manage it and is
appropriate for companies who want to control risk,
regardless of the industry segment they operate in.
The evaluation of the usefulness of hedging should
be based on how it affects revenues instead of how
it matches investment needs.
Before proceeding to discuss how a shipping
company should consider devising a hedging strategy,
it will be useful presenting how companies in the
oil and the transportation industries deal with risk
and hedging strategies. This will facilitate
defining the parameters that are relevant for the
case of a particular shipping company.
It was recently reported that "a tortuous
rethink on the merits of oil price hedging is
underway within the United States oil industry.
Already many end-users are responding to cost
pressures and derivative losses by becoming more
cautious about their use of paper instruments to
lock in prices."2 8 Oil major Chevron has largely
abandoned its oil price hedging strategies in its
domestic refining operations, preferring to focus
its profit-enhancing efforts in cost containment.
Other companies are restricting hedging activities
to periods when prices move outside fixed bands.
Oil analysts note that investors may barely give a
second thought to whether majors such as Chevron are
hedging a portion of daily operations, but concede
that shares of smaller firms such as Oryx and
Amerada Hess, have suffered at times from the
perception that unsuccessful hedging activities have
depressed quarterly earnings. Do real world
developments then disprove the position taken
earlier that hedging is a desirable, value enhancing
strategy?
2 "To Hedge or Not to Hedge?," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (New York: Edward
L. Morse, [September 4, 1995], p. 1.
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The answer is no. It is important to realize
that a company's hedging strategy can result in a
loss or a gain, relative to the outcome that would
occur without this strategy. Therefore, the
decision for a company to enter a hedging program
can not be made on the presumption that results will
always be positive. Losses will be bound to occur
and it should be normal for a company to reevaluate
its hedging strategy. Before a company enters into
a hedging program it should consider the following
arguments.
Firstly, every business needs to expose itself
to risks in order to seek profits. But there are
some risks that a company is in business to take and
others that it is not. A risk management program
should reduce a company's exposure to the classes of
risk it is not in the business to take while
reshaping its exposure to those it is. 29 Hedging
theory as discussed by Froote et al. does not
differentiate between the risks that a company might
be faced with, although this is an important
distinction. In the case of the oil company, the
price of oil is a risk inherent to the business. In
the case of the pharmaceutical company, foreign
exchange risk is not inherent to the industry. This
distinction will be critical for the case of a
shipping company.
Secondly, if hedging is the norm in a
particular industry then it should be done in a
competitive fashion. Conversely, if hedging is not
the norm in a certain industry, it may not make
29 David Weinberger, "Using Derivatives: What Senior Managers Must Know,"
Harvard Business Review, January-February 1995, p. 34.
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sense for one particular company to chose to be
different from everyone else. In an industry
environment where everyone is hedging, losses due to
unfortunate hedging strategies should not be
unexpected. The situation becomes problematic when
competitors become more successful in choosing the
right strategy. When analysts compare the results
of competitors, the company with the unsuccessful
hedge is then perceived to be mismanaging its risks.
It was stated earlier that shareholders of a
company's stock also invest in the ability of
executives to manage risks. Successful management
is only possible when information on market trends
and developments justifies hedging positions. For
th.e case of a shipping company it will be indicated
how a successful risk management strategy will be
integrated with an overall corporate strategy.
Thus, making the distinction between the
different kind of risks a company is faced with and
how they tie in with its revenues and realizing that
a loss resulting from a hedging activity might be
attributed to the choice and management of the
hedging strategy are critical. The importance of
these factors can be made clear with a reference on
how a railroad company and the airlines hedge
against fuel price risk and incorporate it into an
overall corporate strategy. In the railroad
industry, New Jersey Transit (NJT), has been
successfully hedging fuel price risk for over ten
years. It either makes its purchases on the spot
market or it locks in a price which is based on the
NYMEX heating oil futures plus a differential which
reflects basis risk. The agency's philosophy is not
to "try to beat the market" but rather to stabilize
costs. On a yearly basis, it buys 30 million
gallons of diesel fuel so 1 cent of paper gains
means a $300,000 growth in the budget. Obviously,
if the futures market trend goes against its
position it can sell it although this is something
NJT has never done. Management realizes it is in
the transportation business, not in that of trading
futures and commodities. It is also interesting to
note that the agency does not go to the exchange
directly or through a broker but hedges through its
fuel suppliers by telling them the month for which
it wants to lock in a price.30
In the transportation industry fuel price
hedging is much more prevalent among airlines. Fuel
costs are the second largest operating expense after
labor; 12 versus 35%. ATA estimates that half the
airlines have some sort of risk management contract
in place, although they cover less than 50% of the
industry's fuel requirements. Airlines cover
between 5 and 50% of their fuel although most hover
around the 15% mark. Like the railroad industry,
airlines have a wide range of options available,
i.e. committing forward volumes at fixed prices with
futures, doing EFPs of heating oil or WTI to jet
fuel, or going into swaps. According to a fuel
purchaser of a US carrier, volatility in jet prices,
"makes planning hard. If an airline sells advance
tickets for the summer vacation season, it knows the
yields, it knows its equipment leasing costs and the
only variable is fuel... If the management is
confident with their revenue forecast, they should
30 Richard Bava, Futures Market Helps Transit Agency Economically Budget Fuel
Purchases," Enemry in the News, Winter 1994/1995, p. 19.
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be confident of their fuel costs. We are hedging
for predictability on revenue. We are not in the
business of forecasting fuel prices, we are in the
airline business."3 1
The two examples drawn from the transportation
industry illuminate the connection between a
company's revenue base and the type of price risks
it is trying to protect itself from. In both the
railroad and the airline industries, revenues rely
on freight rates which are more often than not fixed
into the future. In case they are variable, this
has more to do with supply and demand for
transportation rather than with changing energy
costs. In either case then, if freight levels and
thus revenues have nothing to do with energy costs,
it makes sense to hedge the exposure to fuel costs.
Put more simply, a railroad company with fixed price
freight will be better off when projecting its cash
flows, if in addition to fixed revenues from freight
it incorporates fixed fuel costs which it can
actually attain. The airline executive makes a
clear statement regarding the case of the industry
he works for. If all margins but one are known,
then it makes sense to set a fixed energy cost as
well. For the case of a shipping company then, the
connection between revenues and fuel costs is
critical in devising a hedging strategy.
Clearly, the railroad and the airline industry
examples also demonstrate a realization of the
overarching principle of a hedging policy. That
risk management should not be implemented in order
31 Sam Glasser, gAirlines Look to Hedging Programs As a Way of Stabilizing Fuel
Costs," Enermy in the News, Winter 1994/1995, p. 10.
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for a company to improve its financial results but
rather to stabilize them as far as certain risks are
concerned. NJT is not trying to beat the market and
the airline executive realizes that his company does
not have any expertise in trading commodities. Of
course, as mentioned earlier this is not to say that
hedging is not done competitively; the statement is
consistent with the fact that the purpose of a
hedging program is to reduce a company's exposure to
risks it is not in the business to take.
So far then it is concluded that a company
should set the following guidelines in devising a
hedging program. Firstly, it should make the
distinction between the risks it is in business to
take and those it is not. The latter should be
limited depending on how they affect the revenue
base. Secondly, negative results from a hedging
strategy can not be excluded but could be avoided or
minimized if the strategy is well thought off and
justified. A company need not gain expertise in
trading positions but should rather make sure it is
getting properly advised on its hedging positions.
b. The Case of a Shipping Company
A 1992 report on bunker hedging estimated that
20% of shipowners used swaps and call options in
order to cover some of their bunker fuel price
exposure. According to the same report this
percentage was expected to increase to 90% in five
years perhaps because of bunker price volatility or
even competitive pressures. 32 It is doubtful that
32 EI-Fakir, The Art of Stabilizing Bunker Prices," p. 69.
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hedging has become so popular amongst shipowners.
The absence of severe volatility in either crude,
fuel oil prices or refining margins in the last two
years is a key underlying cause of the growing
hesitancy among managers to spend money, or risk
foregoing profits in order to lock in a price that
protects them against extreme market moves.33
However, this is not to say that changing market
conditions in the future will not revive interest in
hedging strategies. More importantly, a company
should be in position to act quickly and take an
advantageous hedging position when a weak market
creates a window of opportunity.
The rest of this chapter will outline a
hedging strategy that a shipping company, Eletson
Corporation, should follow in covering its exposure
to bunker price volatility. Although many
companies are heavily involved in risk management,
it is safe to say that there is no single well-
accepted set of principles that underlies their
hedging programs. Ultimately, a company's risk
management strategy needs to be integrated with its
overall corporate strategy. The corporate strategy
of Eletson Corporation to the extent that it is
relevant to risk management will be outlined so as
to set the stage for a hedging strategy.
Eletson Corporation is a privately owned Greek
shipping company involved in the transportation of
petroleum products. It is considered a high
quality, dedicated product carrier operator and its
current fleet consists of 21 tankers of different
33"To Hedge or Not to Hedge?," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (New York: Edward
L. Morse, [September 4, 1995]), p. 1.
sizes. Within the next three years the company will
have completed its fleet modernization program. At
that time, the composition of the fleet will be 24
handymax and panamax tankers. During 1993, the
company issued public debt, thus increasing its
transparency and accountability to outsiders. The
company's philosophy is consistent with taking well
thought out and long term strategic positions in the
segment of the tanker industry it knows best and has
established itself in. However, even if the
products trade is less volatile and more rewarding
than the crude oil trade, Eletson is still operating
in the high risk environment of tanker shipping.
Several aspects of Eletson's corporate
strategy affect or reflect the company's perception
of risk. During the time of the debt issue the
company's rating was BB and Ba2 from S&P and Moody's
respectively 34 . The speculative grade of the
ratings indicates that Eletson faces major ongoing
uncertainties or exposure to adverse business,
financial or economic conditions which could lead to
inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and
principal payments of its debt.
The company is not an asset player in the
shipping markets. Its primary source of income is
from operating revenue. The company has
traditionally refrained from timechartering its
tonnage and has preferred the uncertain but more
rewarding spot market. This operating strategy has
two implications which are relevant in considering a
suitable hedging strategy.
3Since then, the S&P rating has been downgraded to BB-.
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First, since the company has a long term view
on the market, it could put together a hedging
program which would extend far into the future.
Obviously, if the company chooses to lock in a fuel
price this way, it misses the advantages of dynamic
strategic planning; it runs the risk of missing
opportunities as they become pronounced in the
future and foregoes factoring future developments
into its strategy. For example, suppose that
Eletson locks in its fuel prices soon after the
announcement that Iraq will be allowed to resume
exports. The predominant view in the market is that
oil prices will hit very low levels then, before
they pick up again. Fuel oil prices will be
particularly affected.
But what if Iraq no longer feels the need to
abide by its Opec quota? It could increase its
revenues by selling more oil at cheaper prices.
Under this prolonged scenario of depressed oil
prices, Saudi Arabia might refuse to support price
levels by limiting its own exports and resuming the
role of the swing producer. If Opec's quota system
falls apart, it will be hard to do away with the
ensuing oil glut. Even today, without Iraq's
production capacity, Opec finds it hard to
discipline its members to abide by their quotas.
Over the past twenty years, consensus forecasts have
consistently failed to predict major turning points
in the price of oil. If a hedging strategy based on
a long term view of the market is not flexible it
might be unsuccesful. The answer to this question
is that a hedging strategy can be flexible and can
be terminated, at a cost. A new hedging position
can be taken up.
Second, the company's affinity towards the
spot market is a good indicator of the company's
attitude towards the inherent risk of tanker
shipping. When an owner timecharters his ship, he
receives fixed income for the period of the
timecharter in advance. This income does not
include bunker expenses which are paid directly by
the charterer. However, the certainty of long term
employment costs a premium which an efficiently run
fleet would otherwise gain in the spot market.
Eletson does not give up this premium and spots its
vessels. The result is that earnings are uncertain
and more volatile depending on the day to day
developments of the spot market. It could be said
then that Eletson takes the full risk it is in the
business to take. Whether this strategy will change
in the future depends on market conditions. A
change of strategy can not be excluded but it is
likely that the company will remain a predominantly
spot operator.
Seven newbuildings on order are contracted in
US dollars which is also the currency in which
Eletson earns its revenues. There are no other
plans of a major investment that would necessitate
the consideration of exchange rate risk. As for the
company's interest rate exposure, a hedging strategy
has been implemented and is constantly reviewed.
This is a risk the company is not in the business to
take and prefers to manage it. However, hedging the
exposure to bunker price volatility has not been
considered although fuel price price volatility is
also a risk the company is not in the business to
take. In order to understand why this is so it is
critical to understand the relationship between
freight rates and bunker prices. This analysis will
also highlight the difference between a shipping
company like Eletson and NJT or an airline.
When a cargo needs to be lifted from one
location and transported to another, a shipowner
will run a basic calculation in order to determine
his profit or loss from this voyage if his ship ends
up performing it. Given the market levels at any
given time, the owner has the option of either
bidding for the transportation of this cargo if
profitability looks good or passing it if he is
likely to face a loss. Obviously, the decision is
somewhat more complicated in that other factors come
into play. The critical notion, however, is that
the owner incorporates his bunker costs into his
rudimentary calculation. So does every other owner
who is looking at the same business.
Eventually, if bunker prices increase, every
owner whose vessel is in position to transport a
cargo will be looking to increase the levels of the
freight market in order to reflect the new bunker
costs. In reality however, the freight market
adjusts slowly to changes in bunker prices and more
often than not conforms to its own dynamics on a
short term basis. Eventually, freight rates reflect
significant changes in bunker prices. For that
reason when Eletson bids for the transportation of a
cargo, it does not use a specific bunker cost for
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the voyage in question but rather an average price
of bunker costs of the whole fleet. This number is
revised whenever bunker costs change by 10-$20.
The implication of this procedure is that
bunker costs become running rather than operating
expenses. They are variable and taken into
consideration before the conclusion of a voyage
charter. In contrast, in the railroad and airline
industries fuel costs are incurred regardless of
whether a trip is profitable or not. If the
transport price is fixed, and it does not
incorporate changes in fuel costs, then it makes
sense to fix those as well.
In conclusion then, fluctuating bunker prices
are incorporated into the risk Eletson is in
business to take. If the company is not averse
towards freight rate risk, then it need not be
averse towards bunker price risk. However, this is
not to say that Eletson should not consider hedging
its exposure to bunker price volatility. On the
contrary it might enjoy a competitive advantage if
it does. However, since a hedging strategy ceases
to be a necessary exercise, if it is followed, it
should have a very limited downside potential. In
other words Eletson's hedging strategy should be
conservative and designed for implementation when a
window of opportunity occurs. The following
recommendations could lead to the formulation of
such a strategy:
First, Eletson should use over-the-counter
instruments in its hedging strategy. There are a
number of advantages in this. Over-the-counter
instruments can be tailor made to cover a company's
exposure to the fuel oil market as well as suit its
particular requirements in terms of volumes and
locations of purchase. Basis risk can thus be
limited. A hedging strategy using futures contracts
would be more suitable for a company with the
resources necessary to enable it to follow the oil
markets on a daily basis. Such an operation would
be more risky and suitable for a trading company,
not a shipping one. The market of frequently used
options and swaps has many participants and is
rather competitive. This will be reflected in the
pricing of a transaction which should not be based
on.complicated schemes where the risk is fully
covered at a higher price. Using over-the-counter
instruments would also favor a long term strategy
which Eletson is in position to take. Such a
strategy, can be designed so as to take advantage of
cyclicalities in the oil markets. Since hedging is
an option, not a necessity for Eletson, the company
can wait for favorable market conditions before
taking a position. Once an opportunity presents
itself, it might as well be taken advantage of for a
long period of time.
Second, Eletson should start monitoring the
over-the-counter markets on a frequent basis in
order to select the timing of its transaction and
familiarize itself with the workings of the swaps
and options markets. This approach is necessary for
a newcomer in the world of oil trading. A number of
financial institutions and oil companies have
approached the company in order to market their
services regarding hedging. Such activity raises
the question of who should undertake to execute such
a transaction for Eletson. Although the question
can't be answered here it is worth noting that oil
companies which trade derivatives have internal
physical positions which are related to the
companies' oil supplies. Therefore, it would be
necessary for Eletson to examine whether there is
any conflict of interest in dealing with a
particular party. The quality and volume of market
information that could originate from a trading
rather than an oil company should also be a factor.
Trading companies have assumed the dominant role
that oil companies used to have in the oil trade.
NJT's policy of hedging its exposure through its
suppliers would not be suitable for Eletson since
the company uses numerous suppliers. Furthermore,
the issue of bunker quality dictates that Eletson
retains the flexibility of being able to purchase
from the parties that provide the best service.
Third, once Eletson decides on the timing of
its transaction, it should examine the advantages of
a swap and a collar. A transaction involving a swap
or one where the premium paid on a call option is
earned by selling an equally expensive put option
are easy to follow strategies. Their cost would be
minimal, an attractive feature at a time when many
shipping companies are reviewing their cost
structures. Their biggest advantage however, is
their low downside potential when they are entered
into at the right time. Eletson can afford to wait
to pick the right time since hedging is not a
necessity but an option.
The Eletson vessels trade world-wide although
more favorable returns in Europe and the Americas
result in a higher concentration of them in these
geographical areas. Therefore, the hedging of the
exposure to bunker prices should be limited in
Europe-North West Europe and the Mediterranean-and
the Americas-United States Gulf. The figures for
1995 indicate that less than 20% of bunker purchases
were done in the Pacific region. In any case, the
lack of a liquid fuel oil futures contract in the
SIMEX is an indication that hedging an exposure in
the Far East would be problematic anyway.
One of the most difficult questions facing
shipping organizations is who should be responsible
for hedging fuel price risk operations; treasury, a
risk management unit or senior management? Some
companies view bunker price risk as a financial risk
and lump it into the treasury function. Others feel
it is a strategic purchasing division and deal with
it in the operations units. For Eletson, hedging is
a function that should be administered by the
Treasury although decisions should be made in close
consultation with senior management and the
Chartering department. This would be in line with
management's hands on attitude as well as the
prevailing practice relating to other hedging
activities (interest rates.) Bunker purchases have
so far been coordinated by the Operations
department. There is no need for the hedging
program to interfere with the physical deliveries of
bunkers apart from the fact that it would be
necessary for the Operations department to relay
their intentions on time to facilitate the paper
transaction.
Accounting issues need not be handled
differently from the way the interest rate swap, the
company has entered into, is accounted for. This
applies for both the swap and the collar since
settlement would be done once per month in either
case. This is an obvious advantage over a strategy
where futures are involved. The Financial Accounts
Board has issued a standard (FASB 10/94) requiring
companies to make a distinction between derivatives
held or issued for purposes other than trading.
Companies are required to disclose their objectives,
their strategies for achieving those objectives,
their recognition and measurement policies and
information about hedges of anticipated
transactions. For now the standard encourages but
does not mandate disclosure of all quantitative
information related to market risks. However, the
disclosure requirements may get more rigorous over
the next several years in response to demands from
investors and regulators.
Chapter 5: Conclusions
The concept of hedging against the volatility
of future prices of commodities has existed for a
very long time, since the growth of the first
commodity exchanges. However, the relevance of
bunker price risk management in shipping, has only
recently become a financial policy considered by
shipping executives. A contributing factor to this
development is the urgent need to control costs in
an industry where a chronical imbalance in the
supply of ships and demand for transportation have
resulted in very low profitabilities for shipping
companies. In the tanker sector of this industry
risks do not seem to justify rewards. Many of the
major oil companies have diversified out of a trade
that used to be a significant segment of their
vertically integrated structure. For the
independent shipowners who are left behind, one way
to stay in business is either by cutting costs or by
controlling them. The second alternative leads to
risk management considerations.
Bunker prices are one of the more significant
costs that a shipping company is faced with. Over
the last two years, a relative price stability,
albeit at high levels, indicates that controlling
the relevant price risk need not be an immediate
priority. However, developments that took place in
the not too distant past, the Gulf War in 1990, have
shown that hedging is a financial policy that
shipping companies should consider in their effort
to control costs. The expansion of the oil trade in
the exchange markets of New York, London and
Singapore has allowed for the growth, diversity and
competitive pricing of hedging techniques. The
purpose of this thesis then was to present
considerations regarding market fundamentals,
hedging strategies and implementation issues that a
shipping company should be aware of before venturing
to put together its own hedging program.
A pure hedging strategy, i.e. the locking in of
a price, need not be pursued in light of information
regarding fuel oil price trends. The difference
between hedging and speculating is that the former
offers the certainty of a cost, as opposed to the
latter which offers a loss or a profit depending on
a price change. The certainty of a cost can be
arranged anytime, at a high or a low level.
However, it was argued early on in the introduction
that a successful hedging strategy should not be a
simple arithmetic exercise. A strategy executed
when prices are at relatively low levels has a
greater probability of success. Therefore, someone
interested in price risk management of a commodity
should know how its pricing structure is determined
and what changes are likely to affect it in the
future. This was the purpose of the first -in
part,- and second chapters of this thesis.
To the extent that bunker prices are affected
by the price of the underlying commodity fuel oil is
derived from, the lifting of the United Nations'
sanctions against Iraq and the resumption of Iraqi
crude oil exports will create a temporary imbalance
in the crude and products markets. Opec will find
it difficult to accommodate Iraqi capacity into its
quota system. An oversupply of crude oil is likely
to depress price levels before production is
eventually curtailed to bring oil revenues back to
sustainable levels. Therefore, it could be stated
with some degree of certainty that after the oil
price decline when Iraqi oil hits the market, crude
oil prices will not slide to lower levels. If the
quantity of Iraqi crude will affect the oil markets
in general and depress prices, the quality of this
fuel oil rich crude will have an even more
pronounced effect on fuel oil prices. The
resumption of Iraqi exports then constitutes a long
term opportunity to be taken advantage of with a
hedging strategy. The certainty of a fixed bunker
price can be combined with the added advantage of
this price being close to historically low levels.
Otherwise, regardless of how other petroleum
products fare after this short crisis, fuel oil
production will be continuously diminished. By all
accounts, demand for clean oil products, induced by
the Pacific region's energy requirements, will
continue to soar well into the future. The
whitening of the barrel is a gradual process in slow
progress which would result in tightening markets
for dirty oil products if regional developments do
not have more pronounced effects on prices.
On a regional level, different factors will
influence fuel oil prices in the major markets of
Europe, the Americas and the Far East. In Europe,
fuel oil markets are expected to remain tight in the
short to medium term future. However, limits on
production withdrawal which have occurred in the
recent past, the effects of Iraqi oil when it hits
European markets and the introduction of gas into
the equation of energy consumption are developments
that could result in a reduction of fuel oil prices.
Erratic exports from Russia should also have a
dampening price effect whenever they occur. In the
bunker markets of the Caribbean and the US Gulf,
prices are likely to stay around their current
levels. The effects of declining demand for fuel
oil are likely to be negated by the export of
product to Europe. Adjustments in price levels
should originate from the use of gas in US markets
and seasonal weather patterns which have had severe
effects in the recent past. Finally, prices in the
Far East will be determined by the number of
refining projects that go on stream but structural
characteristics of the oil markets in that part of
the world will prevent them from becoming volatile,
thus reducing the need for a hedging action.
Overall, fuel oil prices are currently undergoing a
period of relative strength. Careful monitoring of
the possibilities already presented will help
determine the proper time for action. Again, a
successful hedging strategy should be taking
advantage of depressed prices.
The purpose of the third chapter was to outline
the ways in which hedging is actually done. The
basic hedging instrument used in the oil markets is
the futures contract traded in the exchanges of New
York, London and Singapore. Although the principles
making hedging instruments work are the same
regardless of whether the hedged commodity is a
currency, gold or oil, the case of the latter has a
peculiarity. Basis risk is the differential that
exists at any time between the futures price of the
oil used for the hedge and the spot price of the oil
the hedge is for. The complex price dynamics of
petroleum products with each other and crude oil, as
well as the geographical location of physical,
bunker operations augment fuel oil's basis risk with
paper oil. Consequently, futures contracts may
cover bunker price risk but inadequately.
Swaps and options are based on futures contract
prices but offer the advantage of reducing basis
risk. They can also be tailor made to match a
particular strategy towards risk management, for
example by setting a price protection level. Swaps
and options can be mixed to form more exotic
instruments but complicated combinations are not
recommended. They are offered at higher prices and
are unlikely to affect the effectiveness of a
properly timed hedging transaction. Among the
instruments presented, those that could form the
backbone of a hedging policy include a swap at a low
price level or a collar, i.e. the combination of a
put and a call option. The latter arrangement is
done to reduce premium payments. The selling of a
put swaption is not a hedging transaction by itself
but helps the generation of premiums which can be
used to offset the cost of other hedging
transactions.
The fourth chapter was divided in two parts.
The first one looked at the value of hedging as a
useful financial policy. Contrary to the views
adopted by two academic theories, this thesis
supported the argument that hedging activities
implemented by companies' managers should not be
perceived to be conflicting with investors' desire
to determine their portfolio's risk profile.
Successful hedging should be perceived as part of
sound management. Furthermore, the usefulness of a
hedging strategy should not be valued against the
relationship between investing and financing
requirements but should rather be measured according
to its effects on profits. Examples drawn from the
railroad and airline industries helped demonstrate
that a company wishing to start a hedging program
should consider two issues. Firstly, a company
should classify the type of risk it is trying to
protect itself from and determine whether it is a
risk it is in business to take or not. This will
determine the effects of risk management on the
revenue base. Secondly, competitive pressures
dictate that a hedging strategy should not just
minimize a risk by providing certainty but should
also do so in a competitive fashion. A hedging
strategy should be well thought out and justified.
Once the conditions for a successful hedging
strategies have been defined, a company needs to
implement a hedging program which will be consistent
with its corporate strategy. The second part of
this chapter was devoted to implementation issues
that a shipping company, Eletson Corporation, should
consider before venturing into a bunker price risk
management program. A sketch of the company's risk
exposure was outlined and showed that managing
bunker price risk is not a necessity but an option.
Consequently, Eletson Corporation should consider a
conservative, probably long term strategy that takes
advantage of a weak fuel oil price environment. It
was recommended that the company start monitoring
pricing developments of the basic over-the-counter,
swap and option contracts. These instruments
eliminate basis risk and are competitively priced.
The company need not think about fuel oil price
developments in the Far Eastern markets but should
consider which would be the ideal counterparty in a
hedging transaction. The current, buoyant fuel oil
price environment and the prospects for the future
indicate that there is no need for immediate action.
The company can weigh its options, formulate a
hedging program and implement it when the time is
right.
Appendices
Appendix 1
Over the last ten years, the price of the Opec
basket of crudes has always stayed under the $20/bl
mark, with the exception of the Gulf War period.
Whenever oil prices have dropped well below $16/bl,
during the same period, Opec has acted decisively to
reduce output. In 1993, Opec introduced quotas which
tightened the market considerably. (Source: Monthly Oil
Report, Center for Global Energy Studies. London,
October 13, 1995.)
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Appendix 2
This table shows how erratic Russian fuel oil
exports have been since the beginning of the year.
There is always an uncertainty on export licenses whose
availability depends on domestic requirements. (Source:
Russiawatch, Energy Security Analysis Inc. Washington
D.C., September 27, 1995.)
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This table complements the previous one and shows
the effect of Russian fuel oil exports in the US, North
European and Mediterranean fuel oil prices over a
longer period of time. Decreasing export availability
has resulted in an increase of fuel oil prices; fuel
oil becomes a more valuable commodity when compared to
other oil products. (Source: The International Oil
Market Medium and Long-Term Outlook, Stockwatch
Quarterly Review. Energy Security Analysis Inc.
Washington D.C. April 1995.)
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Appendix 3
This graph shows the dramatic decline in US Fuel
oil demand. It should be attributed, in part, to
increases in the use of gas. (Source: Low Oil Prices -
Is Demand the Key?, Kleinwort Benson Research. London
April 1995.)
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Appendix 4
This table does not differentiate between the
volumes traded in the three exchanges but shows how the
interest of speculators in oil futures contracts has
increased substantially over the last two years, thus
adding liquidity to the markets. (Source: Hedge-Memo,
Energy Security Analysis Inc. Washington D.C. May 23,
1995.)
Average Annual Speculator Open Interest In Commodities
(000 US dollars)
Agriculturals i  Precious ! Others Fuels
Metals
1986 iS 1,383,941 j 1,345,531 $ 465,292 $ 343,428
1987 1 $ 1,280,905 $ 2,199,816 750,807 S 448,286
19881 S 3,334,890 $ 2,025,322 S 576,046 S 540,341
1989 S 2,156,079 $ 2,380,990 $ 638,920 S 566,168
19901 $ 2,834,421 $ 1,708,595 S 675,159 S 677,549
1991i $ 2,975,514 S 1,561,766 S 643,542 S 707,715
1992 S 3,468,926 S 1,389,649 $ 531,117 S 1,005,640
1993i iS 4,685,564 i 3,198,963 5 484,496 S 976,632
1994; S 3,392,005 S 3,253,610 S 624,237 S 1,367,824
19951 S 2,797,041 $ 2,158,623 $ 939,073 IS 1,653,348
Percentage of Total Commodity Investment
19861 39%0/ 38%j 13% 10%
19871 27%1 47%1 16%' 10%
19881 51%! 31%1 9% 8%
1989! 38%! 41%! 11%! 10%
19901 48%i 29% 11% 11%
19911 51%1 27%! 11% 12%
1992 54%1 22% 8%1 16%
19931 50%/ 34%; 5%/ 10%
1994: 39%1 38%i 7%i 16%1
19951 37%( 29%1 12%; 22%i
Appendix 5
The column on the right hand side of the table
shows the number of deliveries of NYMEX futures
contracts as a percent of the total traded volume.
Most of the physical deliveries take place with the
unleaded gasoline contract in New York. The heating
oil contract follows. (Source: Energy in the News,
Winter 1994/1995.)
NYMEX DELIVERIES (IN 000'S OF BARRELS)
Standard Deliveries Deliveries as of %
Contract (Excluding Total Total Trading Volume Cumulanve
Month ADPsiEFPs) .4DP a  EFPsb Delivrief /Vo. Contractsd Trading 4 plume
CRUDE OIL
Total 1993 8,886 21,275 68,339 598,500 22,7112,402 0.13
Total 1994 17.935 9,776 467,036 494,747 26,611,518 0.10
Jan 1994 639 1,016 45.913 47.568 2,178,871 008
Feb 1.016 508 33,091 34,615 1,938,916 0 08
Mar 1,907 2,501 40,309 44,717 2,110,225 0.21
Apr 2,373 72 31,901 34,346 1,912,288 0.13
May 1,735 1,661 36,950 40.346 2,023,022 0 17
June 991 1,018 35,130 37.139 2,780.975 007
July 1,650 965 35,714 38,329 2,352,305 0 I
Aug 814 442 41.516 42,772 2.225,912 0060
Sept 1,887 379 46,440 48.706 2.345,754 0.10
Oct 1,037 99 36,621 37,757 2,050.572 0.06
Nov 1,569 435 34,941 36,945 1,873,384 0.11
Dec 2,317 680 48,510 51,507 2.819,294 0.11
HEATING OIL
Total 1993 10,334 6,284 452,047 468,665 8,439,375 0.20
Total 1994 8,237 6,981 429,993 445,211 9,183,276 0.17
Jan 1994 1,603 655 52,130 54,388 922,134 0.24
Feb 724 569 50.363 51,656 920,366 0.14
Mar 922 622 42,020 43,564 996,625 0.15
Apr 391 93 36,904 37,388 802.750 006
May 69 629 25,495 26,193 716,043 0.10
June 249 510 31,115 31,874 726.971 0.10
July 424 1,186 31,200 32,810 726,343 0.22
Aug 157 1,257 33,097 34,511 624,242 0.23
Sept 967 64 29,468 30,499 605,080 0 17
Oct 145 386 30,340 30,871 607,780 0.09
Nov 838 139 30,105 31,082 542,812 0 18
Dec 1,748 871 37,756 40,375 992,130 0.26
NEW YORK HARBOR UNLEADED GASOLINE
Total 1993 7,015 6,355 449,302 462,672 7,082,990 0.19
Total 1994 12,007 4,814 532,749 549,570 7,743,330 0.22
Jan 1994 1,078 451 34,563 36,092 633,257 0.24
Feb 802 77 40,593 41,472 591,328 0.15
Mar 1,212 249 40,564 42,025 608,863 0.24
Apr 981 228 44,162 45,371 604,181 0.20
May 1,021 205 52,799 54,025 734,994 0.17
June 596 715 41,948 43,259 701,054 0.19
July 687 136 51,944 52,767 653,270 0.13
Aug 907 987 48,551 50,445 651,016 029
Sept 1,967 459 56,066 58,492 704,677 0.34
Oct 648 165 40,487 41,300 605,742 0.13
Nov 379 515 39,817 40,711 587,238 0.15
Dec 1,729 627 41,255 43,611 667,710 0.35
Appendix 6
In 1992-1994, the value of fuel oil, as a percent of the
value of the crude it was derived from increased from the low 70s
to the high 80's in the North European, US and Far Eastern
markets. The correlation between Mediterranean fuel and Russian
crude is much worse and should be attributed to quantities of
product coming into the Mediterranean basin from the Middle East
and North Africa or the discontinuous flows of Russian exports.
In any case, the graph illustrates the significance of basis risk.
(Source: The International Oil Market Medium and Long-Term
Outlook, Stockwatch Quarterly Review. Energy Security Analysis
Inc. Washington D.C. April 1995.)
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Prices of the major oil products also vary with each other. These
three graphs illustrate the differences between the products in
Rotterdam, the US Gulf and Singapore. Basis risk exists between
products as well. It is interesting to note how prices in the Far
East correlate much better and lack volatility. (Source:
Petroleum Market Intelligence. New York, October 5, 1995.)
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Appendix 7
The following pages present sample swap and option
contracts. (Source: Elf Trading S.A. Geneva, 1989.)
SWAP CONTRACTS - 1
CONTRACT NO: GSWBS................................
WE ARE PLEASED TO CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING EX-
CHANGE CONTRACT DONE ON ......... CONSTITUTING THE
SWAP DEFINED HEREINAFTER, WITHOUT PHYSICAL DELIV-
ERY TAKING PLACE. MADE UP OF TWO PARTS AS FOL-
LOWS:
PART A:
SELLER
ELF TRADING S.A.
WORLD TRADE CENTER
10, ROUTE DE L'AEROPORT
CH - 1215 GENEVA 15 / SWITZERLAND
(HEREINAFTER CALLED "ELF")
PART B:
SELLER : THE BUYER UNDER PART A
BUYER : THE SELLER UNDER PART A
PRODUCT: SAME AS IN PART A
PERIOD: SAME AS IN PART A
SUB-PERIODS: SAME AS IN PART A
TOTAL QUANTITY: SAME AS IN PART A
SUB-PERIODICAL
QUANTITY: SAME AS IN PART A
BUYER
(HEREINAFTER CALLED THE "COUNTERPARTY")
PRODUCT:
PERIOD (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE) :
SUB-PERIODS (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE IN EACH SUB-
PERIOD) :
ONE SUBPERIOD BY MONTH INCLUDED IN THE SAID PE-
RIOD THAT IS :
SUBPERIOD I :
TO SUBPERIOD .. :
TOTAL QUANTITY:
EXACTLY ......... METRIC TONS
SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY:
EXACTLY ......... METRIC TONS PER ...
PRICE:
EXACTLY ......... USD PER METRIC TON FIXED AND FLAT.
PRICE:
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SCHEDULE 1 HEREINAF-
TER AND MADE A PART HEREOF THE PRICE PER METRIC
TON FOR EACH SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY SHALLBETHE
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE OF THE .......... OF EACH DAILY
QUOTATION EFFECTIVELY PUBLISHED IN PLATT'S
....................... ................................. FO R ........... RELA -
TIVE TO THE CORRESPONDING SUB-PERIOD.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO
PART A AND PART B
INVOICING:
1) FOR EACH COMPLETED SUB-PERIOD THE PAYMENT
FOR SAID SUB-PERIOD SHALL BE MADE BY THE PARTY
WHICH EMERGES AS DEBTOR WHEN COMPARING THE
FIXED AND FLAT PRICE UNDER PART A WITH THE PRICE
CALCULATED UNDER PART B AND THE AMOUNT DUE
FOR PAYMENT SHALL BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
SAID TWO PRICES MULTIPLIED BY THE SUB-PERIODI-
CAL QUANTITY OF SAID SUB-PERIOD.
2) WITHIN THREE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK FOLLOW-
ING THE END OF EACH SAID SUB-PERIOD ELF SHALL
FORWARD TO THE COUNTERPARTY A TELEX INVOICE
SETTING FORTH THE SAID DUE AMOUNT, THE CREDI-
TOR AND THE DEBTOR, AND THE DETAILS OF THE
CALCULATION RESULTING IN THE SAID DUE AMOUNT.
SUCH TELEX INVOICE MAY BE FOLLOWED BY A HARD
COPY INVOICE.
PAYMENT:
1) PAYMENT OF EACH INVOICE SHALL BE MADE BY THE
DEBTOR TO THE CREDITOR WITHOUT DISCOUNT. DE-
DUCTION. SET-OFF OR COUNTERCLAIM IN UNITED
STATES DOLLARS BY TELEGRAPHIC TRANSFER OF
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FUNDS ("SAME DAY FUNDS")
ON OR BEFORE THE DUE DATE FOR PAYMENT TO THE
BANK ACCOUNT DESIGNATED BY THE CREDITOR. THE
DUE DATE FOR PAYMENT SHALL BE THE SECOND
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW-
ING THE DATE OF THE SAID INVOICE.
2) ANY DELAY BY THE DEBTOR IN EFFECTING ANY PAY-
MENT BY ITS DUE DATE SHALL ENTITLE THE CREDI-
TOR TO RECEIVE PAYMENT OF INTEREST FOR EACH
DAY OF DELAY CALCULATED AT LIBOR (LONDON
INTER BANK OFFERED RATE) FOR CALL MONEY IN
EFFECT ON SUCH DUE DATE PLUS TWO (2) PERCENT.
AGE POINTS PER ANNUM. SUCH INTEREST BEING IN
ADDITION TO ANY OTHER RIGHTS OF CREDITOR ARIS-
ING OUT OF SUCH DELAY, AND IS IN NO CIRCUM-
STANCES TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGREEMENT BY
THE CREDITOR TO PROVIDE EXTENDED CREDIT.
3) IN ANY EVENT BEFORE THE FIFTH BANKING DAY IN
NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE LAST DAY OF THE PE-
RIOD OF THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT, THE ACCOUNT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES MUST BE SETTLED.
4) FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT
ELF NOMINATES THE FOLLOWING BANK ACCOUNT
WHERE PAYMENTS HEREUNDER SHALL BE MADE:
THE COUNTERPARTY SHALL NOMINATE BY TELEX TO
ELF ITS BANK FOR SAID PURPOSES WITHIN ONE
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE DATE
OF THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT.
5) IF THE COUNTERPARTY FAILS TO MAKE PAYMENT
HEREUNDER WHEN DUE. OR FAILS TO MAKE PAY-
MENT UNDER ANOTHER EXCHANGE CONTRACT WITH
ELF WHEN DUE. THEN ELF SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO
BRING THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT TO AN END UPON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE PROVISIONS SET FORTH
IN SCHEDULE 3 HEREUNDER AND MADE A PART
HEREOF. SAID TERMINATION BEING WITHOUT PREJU-
DICE TO ANY OTHER RIGHT OF ELF ARISING OUT OF
SAID FAILURE.
PERFORMANCE BONDS
1) THE COUNTERPART AGREES TO PUT IN PLACE A PER.
FORMANCE BOND ISSUED BY A FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TION AGREED UPON BY ELF FOR AN AMOUNT OF AT
LEAST ............ UNITED STATES DOLLARS AND WITH A
FINAL VALIDITY DATE BEING ........................
2) THE COUNTERPARTY FURTHER AGREES THAT, WHEN-
EVER THE POTENTIAL MARGIN DUE TO ELF AND
CALCULATED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
SCHEDULE 2 HEREINAFTER AND MADE A PART HEREOF
EXCEEDS THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THE PERFORM-
ANCE BOND(S) PUT IN PLACE MULTIPLIED BY EIGHTY
PER CENT. IT SHALL ESTABUSH A FURTHER PERFORM-
ANCE BOND ISSUED BY A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
AGREED UPON BY ELF FOR AN AMOUNT OF AT LEAST
.......... UNITED STATES DOLLARS AND WITH THE SAME
VALIDITY DATE AS IN PARAGRAPH 1) ABOVE
3) SAID POTENTIAL MARGIN SHALL BE CALCULATED
FROM TIME TO TIME BY ELF AND ELF SHALL, WHEN-
EVER THE SO CALCULATED POTENTIAL MARGIN FALLS
WITHIN THE DESCRIPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 2)
ABOVE. BY TELEX NOTICE ADVISE THE COUNTER-
PARTY THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SAID PARAGRAPH 2)
ARE EFFECTED AND THAT A FURTHER PERFORM-
ANCE BOND SHALL BE PROVIDED. DETAILS OF THE
CALCULATION OFTHE SAID POTENTIALMARGIN SHALL
BE SET FORTH IN SAID TELEX NOTICE.
4) FURTHERMORE THE COUNTERPARTY AGREES AND
UNDERTAKESTO PROVIDETHE PERFORMANCE BOND
REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1) ABOVE BY THE END
OF THE THIRD BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDI-
ATELY FOLLOWING THE DATE OF THIS EXCHANGE
CONTRACT AND TO PROVIDE ANY REQUIRED FURTHER
PERFORMANCE BONDS BY THE END OF THE THIRD
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW-
ING THE DATE OF THE TELEX NOTICE REFERRED TO
IN PARAGRAPH 3) ABOVE.
5) IF THE COUNTERPARTY FAILS TO DULY PROVIDE A
PERFORMANCE BOND AND/OR FURTHER PERFORM-
ANCE BOND(S) THEN ELF SHALL HAVE THE OPTION
TO BRING THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT TO AN END
UPON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS SET
FORTH IN SCHEDULE 3 HEREINAFTER AND MADE A
PART HEREOF.
6) THE PERFORMANCE BOND AND ANY FURTHER PER-
FORMANCE BONDS SHALL BE IN THE FORMAT SET
FORTH IN SCHEDULE 4 HEREINAFTER AND MADE A
PART HEREOF.
7) ELF SHALL CALL AND UNDERTAKE TO CALL THE
PERFORMANCE BOND AND/OR ANY FURTHER PER-
FORMANCE BONDS SOLELY TO THE EXTENT THAT
THE COUNTERPARTY HAS NOT MADE DUE PAYMENT
HEREUNDER.
GOVERNING LAW
THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT AND THE SCHEDULE HEREIN-
AFTER SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
-LAWS OF ENGLAND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE CON-
FLICT OF LAW RULES. ANY DISPUTE ARISING HEREUNDER
SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE NON-EXCLUSIVE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE HIGH COURT SITTING IN LONDON AND THE
PARTIES EXPRESSLY AGREE TO SERVICE OF PROCESS BY
REGISTERED MAIL.
TIME
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.
REPRESENTATIONS
EACH PARTY HERETO HEREBY REPRESENTS TO THE OTHER
THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO ENTER INTO AND FULLFIL THIS
EXCHANGE CONTRACT. THAT IT IS LAWFULLY DOING SO.
THAT IT IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO DEDUCT
FOR TAX PURPOSES OR OTHERWISE ANY SUM FROM ANY
PAYMENT TO BE MADE BY IT HEREUNDER AND IF SO THAT
IT WILL FULLY COMPENSATE THE OTHER. AND THAT IT
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE ALL PAYMENTS HEREUN-
DER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PAYMENT PROVISIONS OF
THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT.
SCHEDULE 1I
I) IF FOR ONE BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK OR MORE
BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK (BUT IN THE LIMIT OF
FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK) OF
THE SAID SUB-PERIOD. THE SAID DAILY QUOTATION IS
NOT PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S, THIS BANKING DAY IN
NEW YORK OR THESE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK
(AS THE CASE MAY BE) SHALL BE EXCLUDED FOR THE
PURPOSES OF THE CALCULATION OF THE PRICE FOR
THE SAID SUB-PERIOD.
2) IF FOR MORE THAN FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS
IN NEW YORK OF THE SAID SUB-PERIOD THE SAID
DAILY QUOTATION IS NOT PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S,
BOTH PARTIES WILL ENDEAVOUR TO AGREE ON A
NEW WAY TO CALCULATE THE PRICE FOR SAID SUB.
PERIOD AND SUBSEQUENT SUB-PERIODS. IF SUCH
AGREEMENT IS REACHED A FORMAL TELEX
ADDENDUM TO THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT SHALL
BE MADE AND APPLIED TO THE SAID SUB-PERIOD AND
SUBSEQUENT SUB-PERIODS (IF ANY). IF SUCH
AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED WITHIN TWO BANKING
DAYS IN NEW YORK AFTER THE LAST OFTHE SAID FIVE
SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK, WHERE
PLATT'S SAID DAILY QUOTATION IS NOT PUBLISHED.
THEN THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT SHALL AUTOMATI-
CALLY COME TO AN END UPON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING
SUB-PARAGRAPHS OF THIS PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS
SCHEDULE 1:
2.1 ALL SUB-PERIODS THEN COMPLETED, IF ANY. MUST
BE SETTLED AND CLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO PART A AND PART B.
2.2 THE SUM OF THE QUANTITIES COVERING THE REMAIN-
ING SUB-PERIODS SHALL BE DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER
OF BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK DURING THE CORRE-
SPONDING SUB-PERIODS. THE RESULT BEING
HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS A "'DAILY QUANTITY"
AND EACH BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK OF THE RE-
MAINING SUB-PERIODS BEING ALLOCATED A DAILY
QUANTITY.
2.3 EACH DAILY QUANTITY SHALL BE PLACED IN ONE OF
TWO GROUPS: GROUP 1. IF ANY. BEING THE DAILY
QUANTITIES COVERING THE PERIOD STARTING ON
THE FIRST DAY OF THE FIRST REMAINING SUB-PERIOD
AND TERMINATING ON THE LAST DAY PRIOR TO THE
SAID FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK
WHEN THE DAILY QUOTATIONS WERE NOT PUBLISHED
(BOTH THE FIRST DAY AND LAST DAY INCLUSIVE) AND
GROUP 2 BEING THE RESIDUAL DAILY QUANTITIES.
2.4 DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP 1 TO BE PRICED IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH PRICE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO PART
A AND PART B.
2.5 DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP 2 TO BE PRICED IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH THE PRICE PROVISIONS APPUCABLE TO
PARTA AND AS FAR AS PART B IS CONCERNED ON THE
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE OF LAST FIVE SAID DAILY
QUOTATIONS PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO SAID FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS IN
NEW YORK WHEN SAID DAILY QUOTATIONS WERE
NOT PUBUSHED.
2.6 FOR THE DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP 1 AND GROUP 2
ELF TO PREPARE AN INVOICE SHOWING THE PARTY
WHICH EMERGES AS DEBTOR AND CREDITOR RE-
SPECTIVELY WHEN COMPARING FOR DAILY QUANTI-
TIES GROUP I PRICES ESTABUSHED UNDER SUB-
PARAGRAPH 2.4 OF THIS SCHEDULE 1 AND FOR DAILY
QUANTITIES GROUP 2 PRICES ESTABLISHED UNDER
SUB-PARAGRAPH 2.5 OF THIS SCHEDULE 1. THE
AMOUNT DUE FOR PAYMENT FOR EACH SAID GROUP
SHALL BE THE PRICE DIFFERENCE APPLICABLE TO
EACH OF THEM MULTIPLIED BY THE CORRESPONDING
QUANTITIES. SAID INVOICE TO BE FORWARDED BY
ELF TO THE COUNTERPARTY WITHIN THE FIRST TWO
BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW-
ING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS
SCHEDULE 1 AND TO BE PAID BY DEBTOR IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH PAYMENT PROVISIONS OF THIS EX-
CHANGE CONTRACT.
3. THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 2 OFT.HIS SCHEDULE
I SHALL ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED IF THE SAID DAILY
QUOTATION IS NOT PUBLISHED FOR MORE THAN FIVE
SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK OR IF
PLATT'S ANNOUNCES SUCH CESSATION OF THE SAID
DAILY QUOTATION DURING THE DAYS BETWEEN THE
DATE OF THIS TELEX AND THE LAST DAY OF THE LAST
SUB-PERIOD WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN A SUB-PE-
RIOD.
SCHEDULE 2
1. THE POTENTIAL MARGIN DUE TO THE CREDITOR BY
THE DEBTOR SHALL BE CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS :
POTENTIAL MARGIN
SUM OF THE SUB-PERIODICAL POTENTIAL MARGINS
WHERE
EACH SUB-PERIODICAL POTENTIAL MARGIN IS THE
SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY FOR EACH SUB-PERIOD
NOT YET SETTLED OR PAID FOR MULTIPLIED BY THE
DIFFERENCE BETWWEEN AVERAGE PRICE FOR PART
B AND THE PRICE FOR PART A.
WHERE
AVERAGE PRICE FOR PART B
ARITHMETICAL AVERAGE OF THE DAILY REFERENCE
QUOTATIONS FOR EACH BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK
OFTHE SUB-PERIODS NOT YET SETTLED OR PAID FOR.
THE DAILY REFERENCE QUOTATIONS USED FOR EACH
SUCH BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IS THAT QUOTA-
TION REFERRED TO IN PART B ABOVE PUBUSHED FOR
SAID DAY, OR, IF NOT YET PUBLISHED. THE LAST SAID
PUBUSHED QUOTATION.
SCHEDULE 3
ELF FORWARDS A TELEX AND AN INVOICE TO THE
COUNTERPARTY IMPLEMENTING THE TERMINATION OF
THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT AND SETTING FORTH THE
AMOUNT DUE TO THE CREDITOR BY THE DEBTOR. SAID
AMOUNT BEING CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:
1. ALL SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITIES FOR WHICH PAY-
MENT HAS BEEN MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT SHALL
BE CONSIDERED SETTLED AND CLOSED.
2. THE AMOUNT DUE FOR PAYMENT BY THE DEBTOR TO
THE CREDITOR FOR ALL REMAINING SUB-PERIODICAL
QUANTITIES SHALL BE EQUAL TO THE POTENTIAL
MARGIN CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF SCHEDULE 2 HEREINABOVE APPLIED
TO THE DATE OF THE BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK
FOLLOWING THE DATE OF SAID TERMINATION TELEX.
THE SAID TERMINATION TELEX TO BE FOLLOWED BY
AN INVOICE TO BE ISSUED BY ELF ON THE NEXT
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK AND TO BE PAID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PAYMENT PROVISIONS OF
THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT.
SCHEDULE 4
PROFORMAT PERFORMANCE BOND
FOR THE ATTENTION OF:
ELF TRADING S.A.
WORLD TRADE CENTER
CASE POSTALE 532
10. ROUTE DE L'AEROPORT
CH - 1215 GENEVE 15
DEAR SIRS.
MENT OF ANY SUMS DUE TO YOU UNDER SAID EXCHANGE
CONTRACT A GUARANTEE BY A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
SHALL BE FURNISHED.
THEREFORE ATTHE REQUEST (NAME OF COUNTERPARTY)
WE, (NAME OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION), HEREWITH IR-
REVOCABLY UNDERTAKE TO PAY YOU ON FIRST DEMAND,
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE VALIDITY AND THE EFFECTS OF
THE ABOVE MENTIONNED CONTRACT AND WAIVING ALL
RIGHTS OF OBJECTION AND DEFENSE ARISING FROM
SAID CONTRACT, ANY AMOUNT UP TO UNITED STATES
DOLLARS ........... UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR WRITTEN AND
DULY SIGNED REQUEST FOR PAYMENT AND YOUR CON-
FIRMATION THAT (NAME OF COUNTERPARTY) HAS FAILED
TO MAKE DUE PAYMENT TO YOU UNDER THE SAID CON-
TRACT, COPY OF UNPAID INVOICE(S) TO BE ATTACHED TO
SAID REQUEST.
THIS GUARANTY IS VALID UNTIL............ AND IS GOVERNED
BY THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, PLACE OF JURISDICTION
BEING THE HIGH COURT SITTING IN LONDON.
(SIGNATURE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION)
PLEASE CONFIRM BY RETURN TELEX TO BE RECEIVED BY
US BEFORE 15:00 HOURS (GENEVA TIME) ON THE FIRST
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
THE DATE OF THIS TELEX. ADDITIONAL TERMS OR TERMS
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE SET FORTH HEREIN SHALL BE
CONSTRUED AS PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO THIS
EXCHANGE CONTRACT AND SHALL NOT BECOME PART
OF THIS EXCHANGE CONTRACT UNLESS EXPRESSLY
AGREED UPON BY SUPPLEMENTAL TELEX.
YOU HAVE CONCLUDED ON ................ WITH (NAME OF
COUNTERPARTY) AN EXCHANGE CONTRACT REFERENCE
NUMBER ................................ AS SECURITY FOR THE PAY-
BEST REGARDS
ELF TRADING SA
OTC OPTIONS CONTRACTS - I
CONTRACT NO : GAC .....
FURTHER TO OUR AGREEMENT REACHED ON
.............., 19.  ELF TRADING SA OF 10 ROUTE DE
L'AEROPORT CH - 1215 GENEVA 15, SWITZERLAND
(HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "ELF") IS HEREBY
CONFIRMING THE ISSUE IN FAVOUR OF
................(NAM E).................... O F
................ (ADDRESS)..........................
.......... (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE
"COUNTERPARTY") WHICH ACCEPTS IT, A NO-
TIONAL PRODUCT CALL OPTION (HEREINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS THIS "CALL OPTION") THAT IS
TO SAY THE RIGHT FOR THE COUNTERPARTY TO
BUY FROM ELF A SPECIFIC QUANTITY OF A NO-
TIONAL PRODUCT OVER A SPECIFIC PERIOD AT A
FIXED PRICE WITHOUT PHYSICAL DELIVERY TAK-
ING PLACE BUT WITH A CASH SETTLEMENT. THIS
CALL OPTION IS MADE UP AS FOLLOWS :
1. NOTIONAL PRODUCT
THE NOTIONAL PRODUCT, THE OBJECT OF THIS
CALL OPTION, IS ........ ........... ..............
................................. (HEREINAFTER CALLED THE
"PRODUCT")
2. PERIOD
2.1 GLOBAL PERIOD
THIS CALL OPTION COMES INTO EFFECT AT THE
DATE OF THIS TELEX AND SHALL COVER THE
PERIOD (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE)
STARTING ON : .................. ................... 19 .
AND TERMINATING ON: ............................... 19 .
SUCH PERIOD IS HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
THE "GLOBAL PERIOD".
- 2ND SUB-PERIOD (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE)
STARTING O N : ................................. , 19 .
AND TERMINATING ON : ............ 19..
- LAST SUB-PERIOD (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE)
STARTING O N : .................................. 19.
AND TERMINATING ON : .................. 19..
EACH SAID SUB-PERIOD IS HEREINAFTER RE-
FERRED TO AS A "SUB-PERIOD" AND WHEN MORE
THAN ONE THE "SUB-PERIODS".
3. QUANTITY
3.1 THE GLOBAL QUANTITY
THE QUANTITY (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
THE "GLOBAL QUANTITY") COVERED BY THIS CALL
OPTION DURING THE GLOBAL PERIOD IS ..........
................................... METRIC TONS OF PRODUCT.
3.2 SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY
THE QUANTITIES (EACH HEREINAFTER REFERRED
TO AS A "SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY" AND TO-
GETHER AS THE "SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITIES")
COVERED BY THIS CALL OPTION DURING EACH
SUB-PERIOD OF THIS CALL OPTION ARE AS FOL-
LOWS :
- FIRST SUB-PERIOD ...........METRIC TONS OF
PRODUCT
2.2 SUB-PERIODS
THE GLOBAL PERIOD INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING
MONTHLY SUB-PERIODS:
- 1ST SUB-PERIOD (BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE)
STARTING O N : .................................. 19..
AND TERMINATING ON : ................... 19..
- LAST SUB PERIOD .......... METRIC TONS OF
PRODUCT
4. STRIKE PRICE
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CALL-OPTION EACH
SUB-PERIODICAL QUANTITY IS ALLOCATED A PRICE
(HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "STRIKE
PRICE") OF UNITED STATES DOLLARS .......... PER
METRIC TON FIXED AND FLAT.
5. SETTLEMENT
5.1 QUOTED PRICE
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SCHEDULE 1
HERETO AND MADE A PART HEREOF, FOR THE
PURPOSES OF THIS CALL OPTION EACH SUB.
PERIODICAL QUANTITY IS ALLOCATED A FUR-
THER PRICE PER METRIC TON (HEREINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS THE "QUOTED PRICE") EQUAL
TO THE ARITHMETIC AVERAGE OF THE ........ OF
EACH DAILY QUOTATION EFFECTIVELY PUBLISHED
IN PLATT'S ....... /............ FOR ........ ...
................................................... DURING THE SUB -
PERIOD CORRESPONDING TO THE SAID SUB-PERI-
ODICAL QUANTITY.
5.2 SETTLEMENT AMOUNT
FOR EACH COMPLETED SUB-PERIOD THE STRIKE
PRICE SHALL BE COMPARED TO THE QUOTED
PRICE. IF THE QUOTED PRICE IS GREATER THAN
THE STRIKE PRICE SUCH POSITIVE DIFFERENCE
EXPRESSED IN US DOLLARS PER METRIC TON
SHALL BE MULTIPLIED BY THE SUB-PERIODICAL
QUANTITY CORRESPONDING TO SAID SUB-PERIOD
AND THE RESULTING AMOUNT (HEREINAFTER RE-
FERRED TO AS THE "SETTLEMENT AMOUNT")
SHALL BE PAID BY ELF TO THE COUNTERPARTY. IF
THE QUOTED PRICE IS LOWER THAN OR EQUAL TO
THE STRIKE PRICE, THEN THE SETTLEMENT
AMOUNT SHALL BE ZERO AND NO PAYMENT SHALL
BE EFFECTED AND DUE.
6. PREMIUM
IN CONSIDERATION OF BEING GRANTED THIS CALL
OPTION THE COUNTERPARTY SHALL PAY TO ELF
AN AMOUNT (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
THE "PREMIUM") EQUAL TO US DOLLARS .........
PER METRIC TON OF PRODUCT MULTIPLIED BY THE
GLOBAL QUANTITY THAT IS AN. AGREGATE
AMOUNT OF US DOLLARS ............... '
7. INVOICE, PAYMENT, AND
STATEMENT
7.1 PREMIUM INVOICE AND PAYMENT
THIS TELEX CONSTITUTES AN INVOICE OF THE
PREMIUM TO BE PAID BY COUNTERPARTY TO ELF
WITHIN TWO BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK AFTER
THE DATE OF THIS TELEX. IF COUNTERPARTY
FAILS TO MAKE SUCH PAYMENT ELFSHALL FORTH-
WITH BE RELEASED OF ALL OBLIGATIONS HERE-
UNDER SAID RELEASE BEING WITHOUT PREJU-
DICE TO ANY OTHER RIGHTS OF ELF ARISING OUT
OF SAID FAILURE.
7.2 SETTLEMENT AMOUNT STATEMENT AND
PAYMENT
WITHIN THREE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK FOL-
LOWING THE END OF EACH SUB-PERIOD ELF SHALL
FORWARD TO THE COUNTERPARTY A TELEX
STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE VALUE OF THE
CORRESPONDING SETTLEMENT AMOUNT ANDTHE
RELEVANT CALCULATION IN REASONABLE DE-
TAILS. SAID SETTLEMENT AMOUNT SHALL , IF
GREATER THAN ZERO, BE PAID BY ELF TO THE
COUNTERPARTY WITHIN FIVE BANKING DAYS IN
NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE END OF THE SAID
SUB-PERIOD.
7.3 DELAYS
ANY DELAYS BY A PARTY IN EFFECTING ANY PAY-
MENT BY ITS DUE DATE SHALL ENTITLE THE OTHER
PARTY TO RECEIVE PAYMENT OF INTEREST FOR
EACH DAY OF DELAY CALCULATED AT LIBOR
(LONDON INTER BANK OFFERED RATE) FOR CALL
MONEY IN EFFECT ON SUCH DUE DATE PLUS TWO
(2) PERCENTAGE POINTS PER ANNUM, SUCH INTER-
EST BEING IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER RIGHTS OF
THE PARTY NOT DULY PAID ARISING OUT OF SUCH
DELAY, AND IS NO CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CON-
SIDERED AS AN AGREEMENT BY THE PARTY NOT
DULY PAID TO PROVIDE EXTENDED CREDIT.
7.4 FULL SETTLEMENT
IN ANY EVENT BEFORE THE FIFTH BANKING DAY IN
NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE LAST DAY OF THE
GLOBAL PERIOD, THE ACCOUNT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES MUST BE SETTLED.
7.5 BANK ACCOUNTS
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CALL OPTION, ELF
NOMINATES THE FOLLOWING BANK ACCOUNT
WHERE PAYMENT HEREUNDER SHALL BE MADE :
THE COUNTERPARTY SHALL NOMINATE BY TELEX
TO ELF ITS BANK ACCOUNT FOR SAID PURPOSES
WITHIN ONE BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK FOLLOW-
ING THE DATE OF THIS TELEX.
7.6 U.S. DOLLARS
EACH PAYMENT HEREUNDER SHALL BE MADE
WITHOUT DISCOUNT, DEDUCTION, SET OFF OR
COUNTERCLAIM IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS BY
TELEGRAPHIC TRANSFER OF IMMEDIATELY AVAIL-
ABLE FUNDS ("SAME DAY FUNDS") ON OR BE-
FORE THE DUE DATE FOR PAYMENT.
8. MISCELLANEOUS
8.1 TIME
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND ANY REFERENCE
TO TIME HEREUNDER SHALL BE, UNLESS OTHER-
WISE EXPRESSELY STATED, A REFERENCE TO THE
EFFECTIVE TIME IN NEW YORK.
8.2 REPRESENTATIONS
EACH PARTY HERETO HEREBY REPRESENTS TO
THE OTHER THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO ENTER INTO
AND FULLFIL THIS CALL OPTION, THAT IT IS LAW-
FULLY DOING SO, THAT IT IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED TO DEDUCT FOR TAX PURPOSES OR
OTHERWISE ANY SUM FROM ANY PAYMENT TO BE
MADE BY IT HEREUNDER AND IF SO THAT IT WILL
FULLY COMPENSATE THE OTHER, AND THAT IT
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE ALL PAYMENTS
HEREUNDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF SECTION 7. ABOVE.
8.3 GOVERNING LAW
THIS CALL OPTION SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF ENGLAND WITH-
OUT REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULES.
ANY DISPUTE ARISING HERUNDER SHALL BE RE-
FERRED TO THE NON-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
OF THE HIGH COURT SITTING IN LONDON AND THE
PARTIES EXPRESSLY AGREE TO SERVICE OF PRO-
CESS BY REGISTERED MAIL.
SCHEDULE 1
LACK OF QUOTATION
I IF FOR ONE BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK OR
MORE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK (BUT IN
THE LIMIT OF FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING DAYS
IN NEW YORK) OF A SUB-PERIOD, THE DAILY
QUOTATION REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION
5.1 OF THIS CALL OPTION, IS NOT PUBLISHED
BY PLATT'S, THIS BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK
OR THESE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK (AS
THE CASE MAY BE) SHALL BE EXCLUDED FOR
THE PURPOSES OF THE CALCULATION OF THE
QUOTED PRICE FOR THE SAID SUB-PERIOD.
II IF FOR MORE THAN FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING
DAYS IN NEW YORK OF A SUB-PERIOD, THE
DAILY QUOTATION REFERRED TO IN SUB-
SECTION 5.1 OF THIS CALL OPTION IS NOT
PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S, BOTH PARTIES WILL
ENDEAVOUR TO AGREE ON A NEW WAY TO
CALCULATE THE QUOTED PRICE FOR SAID SUB-
PERIOD AND SUBSEQUENT SUB-PERIODS (IF
ANY). IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS REACHED A
FORMAL TELEX ADDENDUM TO THIS CALL
OPTION SHALL BE MADE AND APPLIED TO SAID
SUB-PERIOD AND SUBSEQUENT SUB-PERIODS
(IF ANY). IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED
WITHIN TWO BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK
AFTER THE LAST OF THE SAID FIVE SUCCES-
SIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK, WHERE
PLATT'S SAID DAILY QUOTATION WAS NOT
PUBLISHED, THEN THIS CALL OPTION SHALL
AUTOMATICALLY COME TO AN END UPON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS SET
FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING SUB-PARAGRAPHS
OF THIS CLAUSE II:
II AALL SUB-PERIODS THEN COMPLETED, IF ANY,
MUST BE SETTLED AND CLOSED IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLES 5 AND 7 OF THIS CALL OPTION.
II B THE SUM OF THE QUANTITIES COVERING THE
REMAINING SUB-PERIODS SHALL BE DIVIDED
BY THE NUMBER OF BANKING DAYS IN NEW
YORK DURING THE CORRESPONDING SUB-
PERIODS, THE RESULT BEING HEREINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS A "DAILY QUANTITY" AND
EACH BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK, OF THE RE-
MAINING SUB-PERIODS BEING ALLOCATED A
DAILY QUANTITY.
II C EACH DAILY QUANTITY SHALL BE PLACED IN
ONE OF TWO GROUPS :
GROUP 1, IF ANY, BEING THE DAILY QUANTI-
TIES COVERING THE PERIOD STARTING ON
THE FIRST DAY OF THE FIRST REMAINING SUB-
PERIOD AND TERMINATING ON THE LAST DAY
PRIOR TO THE SAID FIVE SUCCESSIVE BANKING
DAYS IN NEW YORK WHEN THE DAILY QUOTA-
TIONS WERE NOT PUBLISHED (BOTH THE FIRST
DAY AND THE LAST DAY INCLUSIVE) AND
GROUP 2 BEING THE RESIDUAL DAILY QUANTI-
TIES.
II D DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP 1 SHALL BE SETTLED
AND CLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 5 AND 7 OF THIS
CALL OPTION SAVE THAT THE DAILY QUOTA-
TION PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S ON THE BANKING
DAY IN NEW YORK CORRESPONDING TO A
DAILY QUANTITY SHALL BE USED TO CALCU-
LATE THE QUOTED PRICE OF THAT DAILY
QUANTITY.
II E DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP 2 SHALL BE SETTLED
AND CLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLES 5 AND 7 OF THIS CALL
OPTION SAVE THAT THE ARITHMETIC AVER-
AGE OF THE LAST FIVE SAID DAILY QUOTA-
TIONS PUBLISHED BY PLATT'S IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO THE SAID SUCCESSIVE FIVE BANKING
DAYS IN NEW YORK WHEN SAID DAILY
QUOTATIONS WERE NOT PUBLISHED SHALL
BE USED TO CALCULATE THE QUOTED PRICE
OF THOSE DAILY QUANTITIES.
II F FOR DAILY QUANTITIES GROUP I AND GROUP 2
ELF TO PREPARE A STATEMENT TO BE FOR-
WARDED BY TELEX TO COUNTERPARTY SET-
TING FORTH THE RESULTING SETTLEMENT
AMOUNT AND THE RELEVANT CALCULATIONS
IN REASONABLE DETAILS. SAID TELEX STATE-
MENT TO BE FORWARDED WITHIN THREE
BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK FOLLOWING SAID
SUCCESSIVE FIVE BANKING DAYS IN NEWYORK
WHEN SAID DAILY QUOTATIONS WERE NOT
PUBLISHED AND TO BE PAID, IF GREATER THAN
ZERO, BY ELF TO COUNTERPARTY WITHIN FIVE
BANKING DAYS IN NEW YORK THEREAFTER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SUB-SECTIONS 7.5 AND
7.6 OF THE CALL OPTION.
PLEASE CONFIRM THE FOREGOING BY RETURN
TELEX TO BE RECEIVED BY US BEFORE 15:00
HOURS (GENEVA EFFECTIVE TIME) ON THE FIRST
BANKING DAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY FOL-
LOWING THE DATE OF THIS TELEX. ADDITIONAL
TERMS OR TERMS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE SET
FORTH HEREIN SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS PRO-
POSALS FOR ADDITIONS TO THIS CALL OPTION
AND SHALL NOT BECOME PART OF THIS CALL
OPTION UNLESS EXPRESSLY AGREED UPON BY
SUPPLEMENTAL TELEX.
BEST REGARDS
ELF TRADING SA
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